


SGMOIK



SSMOCI

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*bulletin*

Schweizerische Gesellschaft Mittlerer Osten und Islamische Kulturen  
Société Suisse Moyen Orient et Civilisation Islamique  
Società Svizzera Medio Oriente e Civiltà Islamica

***Somalia***

***La Somalie***

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## Inhalt - Sommaire

Editorial	3
<i>Ruedi Küng</i> Abriss der jüngeren Geschichte Somalias	5
<i>Markus V. Hoehne</i> Structural Transformations in the Somali Setting in the Face of Protracted War and State Collapse	10
<i>Mohamed Haji Mukhtar</i> Multilingual Somalia: Ploy or Pragmatic	16
<i>Abdurahmen Abdullahi (Baadiyow)</i> Emerging Trends of Political Islam	22
<i>Nimo-ilhan Ali</i> Youth in Somaliland: Education and Employment	26
<i>Ali Jimale Ahmed</i> The Litigant	33
<i>Unni Karunakara</i> Lettre ouverte de Médecins sans Frontières: Pourquoi MSF a décidé de quitter la Somalie	37



## Editorial

Sur les plans tant universitaire que journalistique, la Somalie ne fait partie des pays privilégiés ni en Afrique, ni dans les mondes arabe et musulman – elle sombre dans le chaos. Néanmoins nous sommes parvenus à obtenir quelques articles intéressants quant à ses aspects politiques, sociaux, ethniques et linguistiques et espérons en offrir ainsi une image un peu plus nuancée.

Pour nous, Hartmut Fähndrich et Elisabeth Bäschlin, ce Bulletin de la SSMOCI est le dernier dont, chargés par le Comité exécutif, nous ayons assumé la responsabilité rédactionnelle. Nous avons rempli notre fonction de longues années durant : Hartmut Fähndrich a écrit tous les éditoriaux des Bulletins parus jusqu'à maintenant, à l'exception de ceux des numéros 9 à 12 (signés par Andreas Tunger-Zanetti), et à partir du numéro 15, nous avons travaillé ensemble. Il était temps de chercher une relève !

Relève qui, heureusement, est assurée. Dès la prochaine livraison, deux jeunes collègues, Sophie Glutz von Blotzheim (Université de Genève) et Thomas Würtz (Université de Berne), se chargeront de la rédaction et reprendront la fréquence des parutions : printemps et automne. Leur premier numéro aura pour thème :

Somalia gehört – akademisch und journalistisch – nicht zu den privilegierten Ländern Afrikas, beziehungsweise der arabischen und der islamischen Welt. Es ist eines dieser Länder, die immer nur „im Chaos versinken“. Und doch ist es uns gelungen, einige aufschlussreiche Artikel zur politischen, sozialen, ethnischen und auch sprachlichen Situation des Landes zu erhalten. Wir hoffen, dass so jenes Land am Horn von Afrika etwas differenziertere Konturen annimmt.

Für uns beide, Hartmut Fähndrich und Elisabeth Bäschlin, ist dies das letzte Bulletin der SGMOIK, das wir im Auftrag des Vorstands herausbringen und die redaktionelle Verantwortung übernehmen. Wir haben beide diese Aufgabe sehr lange wahrgenommen: Hartmut Fähndrich hat von den bisher erschienenen Heften nur für die Nummern 9 bis 12 (für die Andreas Tunger-Zanetti verantwortlich zeichnete) nicht das Editorial geschrieben, und seit Nummer 15 haben wir die Arbeit gemeinsam gemacht. Höchste Zeit, dass eine Ablösung erfolgt.

Nun ist sie erfreulicherweise geregelt. Vom nächsten Heft an werden eine junge Kollegin, Sophie Glutz von Blotzheim (Universität Genf), und ein junger Kollege, Thomas Würtz (Universität Bern), die Redaktion übernehmen und, so ist es vorgesehen, wieder in den saisonalen Rhythmus – Frühjahr, Herbst – zurückfinden. Ihr erstes Thema wird „Tiere“ lauten. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass das Bulletin unter ihrer Ägide sein Gesicht verändert, es wurde aber beschlossen, an der gedruckten Version festzuhalten, um allen Mitgliedern hin und wieder etwas

La Somalia non è tra i Paesi dell'Africa o del mondo arabo-islamico che godono di una particolare attenzione da parte del mondo accademico o giornalistico. È uno di quei Paesi che continuano semplicemente ad "affondare nel caos". Ciononostante siamo riusciti a ottenere alcuni articoli illuminanti sulla situazione politica, sociale, etnica e anche linguistica del Paese. Ci auguriamo che grazie ad essi questo Paese del del Corno d'Africa assuma contorni più definiti.

Questo è l'ultimo Bollettino che entrambi, Hartmut Fähndrich ed Elisabeth Bäschlin, curiamo per conto del direttivo della SSMOCI e per il quale abbiamo la responsabilità editoriale. Abbiamo svolto questo compito molto a lungo: Hartmut Fähndrich è autore di tutti gli editoriali eccetto quelli dei numeri 9-12, che sono firmati da Andreas Tunger-Zanetti. Dal n. 15 in poi abbiamo lavorato congiuntamente. È giunto il momento di congedarsi.

Possiamo ora farlo felicemente: a partire dal prossimo numero, due giovani colleghi, Sophie Glutz Blotzheim (Università di Ginevra) e Thomas Würtz (Università di Berna), cureranno il Bollettino riprendendone il ritmo semestrale primavera-autunno. Il loro primo numero sarà dedicato agli animali. Non è escluso che sotto la loro guida il Bollettino cambi volto, ma si è deciso di mantenerne la versione cartacea in modo che tutti i membri abbiano qualcosa di tangibile in mano di tanto in tanto. Grazie al lavoro di Nicola Diday è anche possibile accedere online ai contenuti dei numeri precedenti.

Per inciso, anche i nostri successori sono interessati

Fassbares in die Hand zu geben. Der digitale Zugriff auf die Inhalte älterer Bulletins ist, dank der Arbeit von Nicola Diday, möglich.

Übrigens sind auch unsere Nachfolger an Mitarbeit oder an Vorschlägen aus dem Kreis der SGMOIK-Mitglieder interessiert.

An dieser Stelle muss von unserer Seite noch ein sehr herzliches Dankeschön an zweimal zwei Personen gehen, die uns während der vergangenen Jahre geholfen oder gar die Publikation des Bulletins erst möglich gemacht haben: Erstens an die beiden Layouter, Thomas Wunderlin, der über viele Jahre hinweg klaglos das Bulletin zum Druck vorbereitet, und Oliver Thommen, der vor kurzem diese Aufgabe übernommen hat. Zweitens an die beiden Damen, Claude Krul und Letizia Osti, die ebenfalls über viele Jahre hinweg das Editorial ins Französische, beziehungsweise ins Italienische übersetzt und damit zu einer echt schweizerischen Publikation gemacht haben.

Wir wünschen dem Bulletin weiterhin viel Erfolg und eine hoffentlich wachsende Leserschaft.

« Animaux ». Il n'est pas exclu que le Bulletin change quelque peu d'aspect, mais il a été décidé que l'on conserverait la version sur papier pour que tous les membres continuent à avoir du palpable entre les mains. L'accès numérique au contenu des Bulletins passés est assuré grâce à Nicola Diday. Par ailleurs, les collègues qui prennent notre succession seront eux aussi heureux de collaborer avec les membres de la SSMOCI et de recevoir des suggestions de leur part.

Nous tenons à dire notre reconnaissance à ceux et celles qui nous ont aidés ces dernières années, rendant possible la publication du Bulletin. D'abord aux responsables du layout, Thomas Wunderlin qui, sans relâche, a préparé les textes en vue de leur impression, et Oliver Thommen, qui assume cette tâche depuis peu. Ensuite à Claude Krul et Letizia Osti qui, longtemps elles aussi, ont traduit nos éditoriaux en français et en italien, contribuant à faire du Bulletin une publication réellement suisse.

Nous souhaitons bonne route au Bulletin et espérons que le cercle de ses lecteurs s'agrandira.

Hartmut Fähndrich  
Elisabeth Bäschlin

Hartmut Fähndrich

E. Bäschlin

alla collaborazione e ai suggerimenti dei membri della SSMOCI.

In questa sede vorremmo far avere i nostri sentiti ringraziamenti ad alcune persone che nel corso degli ultimi anni ci hanno aiutato o addirittura hanno reso possibile la pubblicazione del Bollettino. Grazie in primo luogo agli impaginatori: Thomas Wunderlin, che per molti anni senza lamentarsi ha preparato il Bollettino per la stampa, e Oliver Thommen, che recentemente ha preso in consegna questo compito; e in secondo luogo a Claude Krul e Letizia Osti, che ugualmente per diversi anni hanno tradotto gli editoriali rispettivamente in francese e in italiano, rendendo così il Bollettino una pubblicazione veramente svizzera.

Auguriamo al Bollettino buon proseguimento e un numero sempre crescente di lettori.

# Abriss der jüngeren Geschichte Somalias

## Ruedi Küng

**S**omalia weist eine auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent ungewöhnliche ethnische Einheitlichkeit auf. Somali machen den grössten Teil (85 Prozent) der Bevölkerung aus, sie sprechen grossmehrheitlich dieselbe Sprache (Somali) und haben die gleiche Religion (sunnitischer Islam) und Kultur. Dennoch hat das Land als unabhängige Nation (seit 1960) keine andauernde Stabilität erreicht. Vielmehr ist Somalias jüngere Geschichte von schweren Konflikten, Gewalt und katastrophalen Notlagen seiner Bevölkerung geprägt und der Bürgerkrieg nach 1991 war einer der destruktivsten der jüngeren Geschichte Afrikas. Die Gründe dafür sind vielfältig. Ab dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts erfuhr das von den Somali bewohnte Gebiet eine Aufteilung, die bis heute nachwirkt. Die konkurrierende Kolonialherrschaft Grossbritanniens, Italiens und Frankreichs teilte das Gebiet der Somali in unterschiedliche Einflusszonen auf und trug ihren Teil zum Konfliktpotenzial bei. Darüber hinaus geriet die Region Harar und damit ganz Ogaden durch die Eroberungen von Kaiser Menelik II. unter die Herrschaft Äthiopiens.

*Ruedi Küng (63) beschäftigt sich seit mehr als 30 Jahren mit Afrika und hat insgesamt elf Jahre in Uganda, Südafrika, Sudan und Kenia gelebt. 12 Jahre lang war er Afrikakorrespondent von Schweizer Radio DRS. Nach einem Philosophie- und Politikwissenschaftsstudium (lic. phil.) war er Delegierter des IKRK und Redaktor für internationale Politik bei Schweizer TV DRS und SR DRS. Er arbeitet heute mit seiner Firma InfoAfrica.ch selbständig als Afrikaexperte.*

Der 5-zackige weisse Stern auf blauem Hintergrund der Nationalflagge Somalias symbolisiert die fünf geschichtlich verschiedenen Entitäten, die bei der Staatsgründung Somalias am 1. Juli 1960 als somalisches Territorium erachtet wurden: Französisch-Somaliland/Djibouti im Nord-


westen, Britisch-Somaliland im Norden, italienisch Somaliland/Somalia im Osten und Süden, Ogaden im heutigen Äthiopien und die nördlichen Gebiete Kenias im Westen. Die neue Republik Somalia schrieb denn auch das Streben nach der Vereinigung aller Somali-Gebiete in der Verfassung fest. Kenia behielt jedoch bei seiner Unabhängigkeit 1963 seinen somalisch besiedelten Landesteil, in Djibouti setzte die Bevölkerungsmehrheit der Issa-Somali zwar 1977 die Unabhängigkeit von Frankreich durch, nicht jedoch den Anschluss an Somalia und der Versuch des Diktators Siad Barre 1977, das Ogaden-Gebiet mit militärischen Mitteln wieder zu gewinnen, blieb erfolglos. Doch bis heute gibt es innerhalb der Somali-Bevölkerung Bestrebungen, die Teilung ihres Gebietes aufzuheben und alle Somali in einem Gross-Somalia wieder zu vereinen.

Darüber hinaus erwies sich vor allem das ausgeprägte Clanwesen der Somali als spalterische Kraft, insbesondere nach dem Sturz von Siad Barre im Januar 1991. Die Somali sind in sechs Hauptclans mit ursprünglich territorialer Basis unterteilt – Darod, Digil, Dir, Issak, Hawiye und Rahanweyn –, die sich in Sub-Clans und nach väterlicher Abstammungslinie in weitere Untergruppen (lineage) unterteilen. Siad Barre, der 1969 durch einen Putsch die Macht eroberte, hatte auf der Basis seines «wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus» die Clans zu gesellschaftlichen Klassen



Am Horn von Afrika: Somalia.

© <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503>



Quelle: [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Somalia\\_clan\\_families\\_and\\_major\\_subclans.jpg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Somalia_clan_families_and_major_subclans.jpg)

erklärt, die es zu überwinden gelte, und die bloss Erwähnung von Clan-Namen und von Ausdrücken, die mit dem Clansystem zu tun haben, verboten. Tatsächlich aber benutzte der Diktator selbst das Clansystem dazu, um seine Macht zu festigen, indem er Clans und Sub-Clans gegeneinander aufbrachte und sich auf seinen eigenen Sub-Clan als Machtbasis abstützte. Dadurch nahm die Opposition gegen ihn zu und wurde immer gewalttätiger. Gleichzeitig behielt das Clansystem seine grosse Bedeutung. Verschiedene Somali stellen allerdings übereinstimmend fest, dass sie vor der Entmachtung Barres ihren Clan nicht gekannt hätten und ihre Clanzugehörigkeit im Alltag keine Bedeutung gehabt habe. Mit dem Bürgerkrieg ab 1991 jedoch sei es für sie überlebensnotwendig geworden, ihre Clanlinie zu kennen.

Nach dem Sturz des Regimes von Siad Barre im Januar 1991 versank Somalia in einen Bürgerkrieg, der von den verfeindeten Warlords erbarmungslos geführt wurde. Während zweier Jahrzehnte hatte das Land am Horn von Afrika keine zentrale Regierung mit faktischer Kontrolle über das Territorium und galt als gescheiterter Staat (failed state). Auch die

heutige, seit 20 Jahren erste repräsentative somalische Führung übt nur begrenzte Macht aus und vermag der Bevölkerung weder weitgehende Sicherheit, noch andauernde Stabilität zu verschaffen.

Und dennoch hat Somalia, wo Fortschritt und Rückschlag so nah beieinander liegen wie in Mogadishu die zusammengeschossenen Gebäude und die neu erstellten Hotels, in den letzten zwei Jahren markante Entwicklung-en erlebt. «In den 21 Jahren nach dem Sturz des Siad-Barre-Regimes hat es fünfzehn Somalia-Konferenzen gegeben, aber immer im Ausland», sagt der Somali Bashir Gobdon, der unter der Regentschaft von Präsident Barre aus Somalia flüchtete und seit 25 Jahren in der Schweiz lebt und arbeitet. Im Sommer 2012 waren 825 Delegierte von allen Stämmen in der Hauptstadt Mogadishu anwesend, um neun Tage lang über eine neue Verfassung zu diskutieren und abzustimmen. Diese wurde am 1. August mit 621 Ja- und 13 Nein-Stimmen bei 11 Enthaltungen angenommen. «Sie ist nicht genau das, was ich selber gewollt habe. Sie ist aber auch noch nicht definitiv. Das neue Parlament wird weiter daran arbeiten und sie dann der Bevölkerung zur

Abstimmung vorlegen. Die Frauen haben mir besonders gefallen. Sie haben immer wieder das Wort ergriffen und gefordert, dass im neuen Parlament mindestens 30 Prozent Frauen vertreten sein müssen. Ihre Forderung wurde allerdings nicht in die Verfassung aufgenommen, die Delegierten anerkannten sie aber dennoch als berechtigt. In den letzten 20 Jahren haben die Frauen Mogadishus einiges erreicht, sie sind in den Nichtregierungsorganisationen, in den Schulen und Universitäten anerkannt. Viele sind öffentlich bekannt geworden. Jetzt wollen sie auch in der Politik akzeptiert sein. Aber in der somalischen Gesellschaft ist es schwierig, einen hohen Frauenanteil in Parlament oder Regierung durchzusetzen. In der somalischen Stammeskultur haben seit je die Männer das Sagen. Frauen haben keinen Zugang zu den Stammesführern. So ist es nur schwer möglich, dass ein Stammesführer eine Frau als Parlamentarierin ernannt. Im heutigen Parlament von 275 Mitgliedern sind weniger als 30 Frauen vertreten.»

Das neue Parlament Somalias ist nicht im westlichen Sinn demokratisch, die Abgeordneten wurden nicht vom Volk gewählt, sondern von 135 Clanführern ernannt. Dabei haben Geld, Drohungen und Einschüchterungen von Politikern und ehemaliger Warlords mitgespielt. Doch ein Schlüssel, der die Clanstruktur der Bevölkerung wiedergibt, wurde eingehalten, nämlich je 61 Abgeordnete für die vier grössten Clans, sowie 31 für die arabischen und afrikanischen Minderheiten. Ein unabhängiges Komitee prüfte, dass die Ernannten ein bestimmtes Bildungsniveau und keine kriminelle Vergangenheit haben und wachte darüber, dass auch Frauen im Parlament sitzen.

### Somalia

Bevölkerung ca. 10 Mio. (85% ethnische Somali, 15% Bantu und andere), davon ca. 1 Mio. Flüchtlinge in Nachbarstaaten, sowie mehrere 100'000 in der Diaspora, die pro Jahr 1,5-2 Mia. US-Dollars an Remissen nach Somalia schicken.

Sprachen: Somali, Arabisch, Italienisch, Englisch

Hauptclans: Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Isaak, Rahanweyn

Den grössten Bruch mit der Vergangenheit vollzog dieses Parlament, als es nicht wie erwartet die alte Garde der Übergangsregierung wiederwählte, sondern mit 190 zu 79 den 57jährigen Hassan Sheikh Mohamud vom Hawiye-Clan, Ingenieur und Bürgerrechtsaktivist. Im Bürgerkrieg war er in Somalia für NGOs und die UNO tätig und hat sich für verschiedene Friedensinitiativen eingesetzt. Als Mitglied der somalischen Muslimbrüder dürfte er weniger radikal als sein islamistischer Vorgänger sein. Präsident Mohamud seinerseits bestimmte einen politisch unbekanntem Kollegen und Geschäftsmann zum Regierungschef, musste diesen jedoch nach etwas mehr als einem Jahr wieder ersetzen, weil sie sich nicht auf eine Regierung einigen konnten, in der möglichst viele Clan-Interessen vertreten sind. Der neue Premier Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed ist Wirtschaftsfachmann, jedoch ohne politische Erfahrung im zerstrittenen Land.


Ihre Aufgabe ist ohne Zweifel herkulisch und sie haben dafür wenig politische Erfahrung. Regierung und Parlament sind zudem fast gänzlich auf den Schutz der über 17'000 Militär- und Polizeikräfte der Mission der Afrikanischen Union in Somalia AMISOM angewiesen. Wie real die Gefahren sind, machte der Selbstmordanschlag der al-Shabab-Milizen auf den Präsidenten kurz nach dessen Wahl deutlich, bei dem mindestens acht Personen getötet wurden, Präsident Hassan aber unverletzt blieb. Auch können die neuen somalischen Machthaber ihren Einfluss nur im Raum Mogadishu, in Städten wie Baidoa, Afgoye und Kismayo, sowie in einem relativ kleinen Gebiet im Zentrum des Landes geltend machen. Im Norden des ehemaligen somalischen Territoriums behauptet sich Somaliland seit 1991 als unabhängiger Staat, der jedoch international nicht anerkannt ist. Am äussersten Horn von Afrika besteht Puntland auf politischer Teil-Autonomie. Puntland und Somaliland sind zudem in einen Streit um Territorium verstrickt. Im restlichen Teil des somalischen Territoriums beherrschen die Milizen der radikalislamischen al-Shabab weite Gebiete. Auf Unterstützung in der Bevölkerung können «die Jungen» (wörtl. al-shabab) nicht zählen. Die Bevölkerung hatte zwar die Frustration darüber, dass Äthiopiens Armee 2006 die Union der Islamischen Gerichte gewaltsam entmachtete, mit den al-Shabab geteilt, denn die Islamischen Gerichte hatten nach dem andauernden Wüten der Warlords zum ersten

Mal eine gewisse Ruhe in Mogadischu und anderen Orten einkehren lassen. Den Hass der Jungen auf alles, was in ihren fanatisierten Augen unislamisch ist, und ihr Zusammengehen mit al-Kaida und den selbst ernannten Gotteskriegerern aus Afghanistan, Pakistan und den Golfstaaten teilt die Bevölkerung nicht. Auch sind der somalischen Bevölkerung die Kultur- und Frauenfeindlichkeit und die drakonischen Scharia-Körperstrafen der Fanatiker fremd und sie muss dafür einen hohen Blutzoll zahlen. Als 2012 das Nationaltheater nach über 20 Jahren zum ersten Mal wieder seine Tore öffnete und hunderte Zuschauer und Zuschauerinnen im Saal unter freiem Himmel, weil das Dach zerstört ist, ein lokales Stück, traditionelle Musik und komödiantische Darbietungen verfolgten, schlug unweit eine Granate der al-Shabab ein und tötete mehrere Personen. Kurze Zeit darauf tötete eine Bombe im Theater acht Leute, die an einer Feier zum ersten Jahrestag der Wiederinbetriebnahme des nationalen Radios und Fernsehens teilnahmen. Schon 2009 hatte ein als Frau verkleideter al-Shabab-Attentäter eine Bombe in Mogadischu Shamo-Theater gezündet, als die Absolventen der Benadir-Universität den erfolgreichen Abschluss ihrer medizinischen Studien feierten. Er riss 19 Personen – Lehrer, Eltern, Studenten und Minister – mit in den Tod und verletzte 40 weitere. Die Benadir-Universität war 2002 gegründet worden, um die Ärzte zu ersetzen, die im Bürgerkrieg getötet wurden oder Somalia verlassen haben. 2008 hatte al-Shabab eine Bombe gegen

Mogadischu Strassenwischerinnen eingesetzt und in der Hauptader Maka al-Mukarama 21 von ihnen getötet. Die Frauen sind von den Stadtbehörden angestellt und erhalten für ihre Arbeit Nahrungsmittel vom Welternährungsprogramm.

Zwar ermöglicht der massive Einsatz der AMISOM-Soldaten aus Uganda, Burundi und anderen afrikanischen Staaten, sowie äthiopischer und kenianischer Militär-Einheiten den Bewohnerinnen und Bewohnern der Städte und insbesondere Mogadischu seit Mitte 2011 ein Leben unter friedlicheren Bedingungen als zuvor. Militante Anhänger der al-Shabab verüben jedoch immer wieder Bomben- und Minenattentate, sowie Mordanschläge gegen AMISOM-Truppen und -Einrichtungen, sowie auch gegen ihnen missliebige Personen, insbesondere gegen Politiker und Journalisten.

Der Terror der fanatischen Fundamentalisten ist auch nicht Somalias einziges Problem. 2011 versetzte einmal mehr eine Dürrekatastrophe – die grösste in sechs Jahrzehnten – mehrere Millionen Somali in schwerste Not. Im ganzen Land und insbesondere in Mogadischu zirkuliert eine ungeheure Zahl von Waffen, Dispute werden sehr schnell mit der Waffe ausgetragen. Die politische Kultur ist von Machtstreben, Korruption und Bereicherung geprägt, die Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber der somalischen Bevölkerung den Politikern und Behörden fremd. Der Weg Somalias zu einem funktionierenden Staat ist noch weit.



Die einen kämpfen ums Überleben, die anderen um die Macht.

## Somalias kriegerische Geschichte

- 1960 Das britische Protektorat Somaliland und die italienische Kolonie Somalia werden zum unabhängigen Staat Vereinigte Republik Somalia vereint. Die Grenzziehung schafft Probleme mit den Nachbarn Äthiopien, Kenia and Djibouti, wo auch Somali leben. 1964 kommt es zu bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen mit Äthiopien.
- 1969 Muhammad Siad Barre stürzt den Präsidenten Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke, der getötet wird.
- 1970 Siad Barre erklärt Somalia zum sozialistischen Staat, verstaatlicht die wichtigsten Wirtschaftszweige und verbündet sich mit der Sowjetunion. 1977 versucht er, das äthiopische Ogaden-Gebiet zu erobern, wird 1978 aber vom inzwischen auch mit der Sowjetunion verbündeten Äthiopien zurückgeschlagen. Barre wendet sich darauf den USA zu.
- 1981 Die Opposition gegen Barre wächst, da dieser entgegen seiner proklamierten Politik, die Clan-Strukturen zu überwinden, immer mehr Angehörige seines eigenen Sub-Clans (Darod-Marehan) in Machtpositionen hievt.
- 1991 Präsident Barre wird von gegnerischen Clans gestürzt. Deren Anführer Mohamed Farah Aidede und Ali Mahdi Mohamed können sich nicht auf einen Präsidenten einigen und bekämpfen sich mit Waffengewalt. Dem Krieg der Warlords fallen Tausende von Zivilisten zum Opfer. Der Nordwesten erklärt sich zur unabhängigen Republik Somaliland, die von niemandem anerkannt wird, aber relativ stabil ist. Somalia hat keine Zentralregierung mehr.
- 1992 US-Marines landen in Somalia als Vorbereitung einer Mission von UNO-Truppen. Die US-Soldaten ziehen 1993 ab, nachdem Marines getötet und ihre Körper durch Mogadischu geschleift werden (als «Black Hawk Down» verfilmt). 1995 ziehen auch die erfolglosen Blauhelme wieder aus Somalia ab. Der Bürgerkrieg der Warlords geht weiter. Mehr als ein Dutzend Friedenskonferenzen ausserhalb Somalias vermögen ihn nicht zu beenden.
- 1998 Puntland erklärt sich zu einem autonomen Gebiet.
- 2004 Die 14. Friedenskonferenz in Kenia setzt ein Übergangsparlament und eine -regierung ein. Ihre Vertreter werden von islamistischen Gruppen bekämpft.
- 2006 Die Union der Islamischen Gerichte besiegt die Warlords und übernimmt die Macht in Mogadischu und in Gebieten im Süden, wo sie auf Grundlage der Scharia so etwas wie Ruhe und Ordnung wiederherstellt. Mogadischu Flug- und Meereshäfen können zum ersten Mal seit 1995 wieder benutzt werden. Ägypten und die USA erachten die Anführer der Union der Islamischen Gerichte als «islamistisch und terroristisch». In Absprache mit den USA und der somalischen Übergangsregierung stürzt die äthiopische Armee die Union.
- 2007 In der Folge bekämpfen die radikaleren Anhänger der islamistischen al-Shabab (wörtl. die Jungen) Übergangs-Regierung und -Parlament, die nun von den Truppen der Afrikanischen Union AMISOM beschützt werden. Al-Shabab schliesst sich al-Kaida an und erobert weite Gebiete Somalias, wo sie ein radikal-islamisches Regime errichten
- 2011 Die AMISOM vertreibt die al-Shabab aus Mogadischu.
- Aug. 2012 Eine Verfassungskonferenz verabschiedet provisorisch eine neue Verfassung. Die Clan-Führer ernennen ein neues Parlament, die erste repräsentative Volksvertretung seit über 20 Jahren, und beenden damit die achtjährige Übergangsperiode. Dieses wählt am 11. Sept. den unbekanntem Intellektuellen und Friedensaktivisten Hassan Sheikh Mohamud zum neuen Präsidenten.
- Okt. 2012 AMISOM- und Regierungstruppen erobern von al-Shabab Kismayo mit dem zweitgrössten Hafen des Landes sowie die Stadt Wanla Weyn im Nordwesten Mogadischu zurück.
- 2013 Die USA anerkennen zum ersten Mal seit 1991 wieder die Regierung Somalias und sind zu Militärhilfe bereit.
- Sept. 2013 Internationale Geberstaaten versprechen 2,4 Mia.\$ als Wiederaufbauhilfe und zur Stärkung der Wirtschaft und der Sicherheit.

Zusammengestellt von Ruedi Küng, InfoAfrica.ch, ehemaliger Afrikakorrespondent von SRF-Radio

# Structural Transformations in the Somali Setting in the Face of Protracted War and State Collapse

Markus V. Hoehne

This article looks into selected political, legal and social dynamics in Somalia before and mainly after 1991, when the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre was toppled and the state faltered. The guiding question is in how far Somali ingenuity provided solutions for problems caused by the absence of overarching, stable and effective government structures. The argument is that, on the one hand, protracted conflict and statelessness was of course hugely destructive in the Somali setting; but on the other, it has brought about chances to change, transform, test the limits and pave the way for innovations.<sup>1</sup> Thus, from a certain perspective, civil war and state collapse were blessings in disguise. This is not to ignore the downside of the crisis in the Somali setting that is far from over and is still driven by internal and external spoilers. The aim is, however, to go beyond the usual buzzwords used when talking about the Somali disaster, such as ‘warlordism’, ‘state collapse’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’ and look what has developed during crisis in a creative and constructive manner.

## Structural transformations New states

The violence in Somalia from 1991 onward did not only give rise to the dissolution of the state. It also provided space for the political reorganization within the boundaries of the failed state and beyond. Ken Menkhaus, a long-term observer of Somalia, spoke with regard to the situation in the 1990s about the ‘radical localization’ of politics in collapsed Somalia.

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Many clans and sub-clans sought to establish their militia and local stronghold (some were more successful than others in that; and so called minority groups were not able to create their own military basis, due to structural marginalization, lack of access to resources and lack of ‘warrior traditions’). Besides warlord fiefdoms there were also areas

controlled by the armed Islamist group Al Ittihad Al Islami (AIAI). This group briefly controlled the port of Bosaso in the northeast. Once it was evicted from there by rival warlords, AIAI established its ‘Caliphate’ in a place called Luuq in southwestern Somalia, near the Ethiopian border. These local forms of rule were genuinely instable, because they were mainly based on the use of armed force. In the warlord rules, force was complemented by ‘clanism’, a sentiment binding descendants of a common patrilineal ancestor together (and actively manipulated by clan politicians and militia leaders). In the Caliphate of AIAI, Islamist ideology together with force was used to increase cohesion and stability. Additionally, the Islamist leaders accommodated clan to some extent and cooperated with local elders. However, warlord and Islamist fiefdoms rarely existed for long and in a clearly demarcated territorial shape; there was a lot of competition and warring including external interferences.

Ethiopia, for instance, paid certain warlords against others or against AIAI, and Eritrea supported Ethiopia’s adversaries (after the honeymoon between Addis Ababa and Asmara was over in the mid-1990s).

In 1996, Ethiopian air force bombarded Luuq to end the threat which AIAI activities in the Somali region of Ethiopia (also known as Ogaden) posed to stability in the country. These local rules rarely featured a bureaucratic and transparent political and legal order. Elders, militia leaders and sheikhs took the decisions, based on customary law, shari’a and personal considerations backed by armed force. This means that warlord or Islamist rules were not ‘chaotic’ or ‘lawless’; but they certainly were not ‘state-like’.

The first state-like entity that emerged out of the ruins of civil war and collapse was the Republic of Somaliland. Territorially, it comprised of northwestern Somalia that had been a British Protectorate until 26 June 1960. The remainder of Somalia, the northeast and the south, had been under Italian colonial administration. On 1 July 1960 both entities united to form the Somali Republic. But post-colonial statehood descended into dictatorship. In 1981, members of the dominant descent group from the northwest called Isaaq formed a guerilla group called Somali National Movement (SNM) to fight against the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre (1969-1991). In this fighting, the northwest was devastated. In early 1991 the Somali government was toppled by southern rebels who had been loosely allied to the SNM. The Isaaq guerillas called upon all the clans residing in the northwest to meet to discuss about peace and the political future. At a clan conference in Bur’o the independence of Somaliland (in the borders of the former British Protectorate) was declared. But Somaliland did not gain international recognition.

In the absence of recognition, Somaliland developed into a viable de facto state over the past two decades, featuring all key aspects of statehood (a stable government; a clearly demarcated boundary; a permanent population) but lacking international recognition. But the path to stability and peace in Somaliland was not ‘straight’ or ‘simple’. Initially, the government was in the hands of the SNM. But soon, competition over power and the few lucrative resources in the country (such as the port of Berbera) led to in-fighting between SNM leaders commanding (together with the elders) the young men of their respective clans and sub-clans. Interventions by elders often helped to mediate the fighting. Therefore, Somaliland is frequently mentioned in the literature as an example for the productive and creative use of

Somali traditions of conflict settlement. It is clear, however, that also war played a role in Somaliland’s state-formation. In his analysis of the politics of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the second president of Somaliland (1993-2002), Dominik Balthasar argues that, first, Egal successfully consolidated his government economically. Second, Egal actually fostered war between various Isaaq clans between 1994 and 1996 which provided him with the chance to emerge as the uncontested leader of the country (and do away with former SNM commanders). The last ‘national’ clan conference in Hargeysa end of 1996 and early 1997, at which Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was re-elected as president, marked the beginning of increasingly strong and centralized governance in Somaliland, and of relatively stable statehood at least in the western and central regions of the de facto state.

What does this tell us about political transformations in the Somali setting after 1991?

First, Somaliland, like also other local polities that emerged soon after the collapse of the government, exhibited initially a personalized form of rule based on patrilineal descent. It was not much more than a conglomerate of clan fiefdoms led by SNM commanders and elders, held together by the experiences during the guerilla struggle in the 1980s and the declaration of independence in 1991. On the way to stable de facto statehood traditional strategies of conflict settlement as well as hard political decisions including those leading to renewed civil war played an important role. The example of Somaliland shows first, that Somalis are capable of building stable and peaceful polities.

Second, state formation in Somaliland happened without much external help. Since Somaliland was not internationally recognized, it did not received much humanitarian or development aid in the first decade of its existence (things changed in the early 2000s; from then onward, Somaliland received more support short of recognition).

Third, and most importantly: state-building is a long winded, messy and possibly violent affair (the current developments in South Sudan end of 2013 are a case in point). With regard to southern Somalia, where the main focus of the international community lay in recent years, this means that with the so called ‘end of the transition’ in Mogadishu mid-2012, state-formation in this region has only begun.

One cannot expect that the schedule and plans laid out by the new government in Mogadishu and its international supporters are likely to lead to quick success in Somalia.

### Hybrid political orders

Somaliland, but also Puntland, which was established as autonomous region in northeastern Somalia in 1998 and the administration built by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in the regions Bay and Bakool in southern Somalia between 1998 and 2002, exhibit what in the political science literature is discussed as hybrid political orders. These orders combine state and non-state or 'modern' and 'traditional' political institutions. In the Somali cases, this means that besides military commanders and/or politicians, traditional authorities are integrated in the political process. They constitute the Upper House of parliament (as in Somaliland), nominate the parliamentarians (as in Puntland) or simply assist with conflict settlement and engage in day-to-day local governance (as in the case of the RRA administration, but also in Somaliland and Puntland). Hybrid political orders in general are seen in the literature as a way to constructively accommodate different types of legitimacy in settings characterized by fragile or weak statehood.

It is proposed here that the hybrid political orders in Somaliland and elsewhere in the Somali setting indeed constitute a remarkable innovation and provided a kind of remedy against chaos following civil war and statelessness. However, a closer look particularly at the well-established hybrid political order in Somaliland shows that these forms of political organization tend to become imbalanced, which can produce new conflict. Thus, the excitement of some authors about hybrid political orders as the way forward for African polities is not justified.

While traditional authorities had played a role in Somali politics already before 1991, hybridity flourished openly once the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre was gone, which officially had fought 'tribalism' (and with it, the political importance of elders). Traditional authorities had supported the guerrilla struggle of the SNM in the 1980s. Once Somaliland was declared, traditional authorities had the main responsibility for peace in the northwest. The SNM leaders soon were confronted with in-

ternal rivalries which escalated into open violence at several occasions between 1992 and 1995 and brought Somaliland to the brink of collapse. In this phase traditional authorities constantly negotiated between the warring groups and thus guaranteed the existence of Somaliland. Their moment of glory was the institutionalization of their powers in the Guurti, the Upper House of parliament at the clan conference in Boorama in 1993. Since then, however, their star steadily sank. The closer the members of the Guurti and other high ranking traditional leaders worked with the government in Hargeysa (Somaliland), the more they lost traditional legitimacy. Simultaneously and as already mentioned above, President Egal managed to establish himself as a strong president in the second half of the 1990s. He bribed Guurti members and traditional clan leaders outside of the parliament to follow his will. Sometimes he also intimidated them, as in 2001, when Egal incarcerated a number of clan leaders who had gathered in the capital to challenge him over a political issue. In this way, the Guurti members and high-ranking traditional authorities became increasingly handmaidens of the president.

This policy was continued under the next president Dahir Rayale Kahin (2002-2010). The Guurti members not only lost their independence (and traditional legitimacy). They also hampered democratic progress. Between 2002 and 2012, a series of democratic elections was held in Somaliland (including two local government and two presidential elections, and one parliamentary election that concerned only the Lower House called Goolaha Wakiilada in Somali). Yet, the members of the Guurti have never been elected since the foundation of the Upper House in 1993, despite the constitutional provision (dating from 2001) that the members of the Guurti had to be elected one year after the members of the Lower House. In 2006, President Kahin prolonged the term of the Guurti by decree. In exchange, the Guurti prolonged the presidential term several times between 2008 and 2010. Some perceived this prolongation of the president's term as illegal. In this period, tensions in Somaliland flew high and many internal and external observers actually worried about massive corruption and autocratic tendencies within the Somaliland government.

Ethnographic research of the author in various parts of Somaliland between 2002 and 2013 showed first, that members of the Guurti as well as high ran-

king traditional authorities outside of the government who got involved with national politics in Somaliland actually lost power. This was mainly related to a loss of traditional legitimacy, which originally was related to solving concrete problems on the ground (e.g., dealing with conflicts over water and pasture), among their followers (members of particular patrilineal groups). From the mid-1990s onward, the traditional authorities successively became a subordinate institution at least in the areas where the power of the government increased (mainly in western and central Somaliland). This transformation of the powers of traditional authorities, from important aides of the guerrillas (mainly the SNM) to peace builders in the emerging de facto state of Somaliland, to dependent and even corrupt 'quasi-politicians' shows the limits of hybrid political orders. Hybrid political orders may be effective in assisting the transition from a war-torn or very fragile context into a more stable form of political existence. But they do not provide a long-term remedy against state fragility and thus should not be counted on for too long.

This also has implications for the ongoing peace- and state-building process in southern Somalia. There, the end of the transition in 2012 was – following a plan by the UN and the transitional Somali government – guided by several hundred traditional authorities whose traditional credentials were not always clear but who nevertheless were put in charge of adopting the constitution and nominating the parliamentarians. The latter then elected the new president of Somalia. From the beginning of this process, accusations of massive bribing of traditional leaders by politicians flared up. One needs to keep in mind that the merging of traditional and modern (state-) authority comes at a cost and can lead, in the medium term, to serious imbalances within a hybrid political order which is neither democratically nor traditionally fully legitimate.

### Role of customary Law

Similar to traditional authorities, customary law or *xeer* in Somali regained strength after the collapse of the state. Under the post-colonial governments between 1960 and 1991 it was officially disregarded but continued to play a role at the margins of the 'modern' state. From 1991 onward, *xeer*, together with Islamic *shari'a*, provided the only remaining basis for a kind

of legal order in stateless Somalia.

In a recent article Günther Schlee emphasizes the basic characteristics of Somali customary law (which actually are the same in other similar customary legal systems): retaliation between the conflicting parties or negotiations about compensation to avoid retaliation, and collective allocation of liability and collective payments and distribution of compensation. He goes on to show that customary law is power-sensitive. Like in all bargaining situations, the parties may have different bargaining power. The logic of compensation is based on that of retaliation. The only purpose of compensation is to avoid retaliation. Therefore, the stronger partner in negotiations can demand a 'better deal' for itself, otherwise it may resort to retaliation.

This leads to the conclusion that customary law, which provided a legal basis in the absence of statutory law in Somalia since 1991, should not be confused with a system that – like state law, at least in principle – aims at providing equal justice for all. Therefore, statelessness certainly did not mean lawlessness in many regards, but it certainly meant quite different chances to get justice for different social groups (women, men, majority groups, minority groups). Individual accountability was replaced with collective accountability, and retaliation frequently prevailed over compensation. Punishment in the western legal sense was almost absent. This means: from 1991 onward, most perpetrators committed their deeds with impunity and only, at best, collective responsibility was established. This was different under the governments before 1991 (it was also partly different under the Union of Islamic Courts and al-Shabab that effectively ruled much of southern Somalia between 2006 and 2011 and used *shari'a* which knows individual accountability). This transformation from a statutory to a customary legal order over the past decades has long-term effects for the currently ongoing reconstruction process in Somalia. In many areas of Somalia, people have only a vague memory if at all of statutory law. Any new legal system has to prove its effectiveness before it becomes accepted in a setting in which customary law and *shari'a* had filled the void left by the collapse of the state institutions. Even in Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia, where effective state-like orders exist since over a decade, customary law prevails over statutory law, at least in the vast rural hinterlands.

## Empowerment of Women

The last transformation I would like to highlight here concerns the social, political and economic status of women in the Somali society. Somali society can be characterized as patriarchal to the bone. But upon closer examination, one can argue that civil war and state collapse provided a blessing in disguise for Somali women. In pre-colonial and post-colonial time until 1991, Somali women played hardly any role in politics. They did not feature at all in the democratic government between 1960 and 1969. Even the socialist government under Mohamed Siyad Barre empowered women only rhetorically. But actually, women gained very little political power during that period. Women were sometimes used for propaganda campaigns, yet the Politbureau consisted only of men; in the Central Committee there was only one woman out of 76 members; in the 51 member council of ministers there were only two female vice-ministers, and only around 6 per cent of the parliament were female. In the economic sphere, women were in pre-colonial, colonial and early post-colonial time largely confined to the nomadic or urban household and were supposed to look after the children, the animals and the house. In the countryside women contributed substantially to the pastoral-nomadic economy, but this did not translate into high social or political status. Up until 1991, Somali society remained essentially a patriarchal society, despite national discourses about modernization and socialism, and social and economic developments related to urbanization. Politics and economy was the domain of men.

Things changed visibly from 1991 onward. Already in the late 1980s, women supported armed guerilla movements. Some took up arms; others supported the fighters in other ways (e.g., through cooking and washing or as nurses in bush camps). Despite the cliché about the passive and peace-loving Somali women, many encouraged their men to fight in the clan-wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They used female forms of poetry called buraambur in Somali to instigate fighting. But the longer the civil war lasted, the more women turned their energies and skills to peace making. Individually or collectively, Somali women protested for and demanded peace, and again sought to influence their men through buraambur. As members of their own patrilineal clans and wives to men from other clans (due to clan-exogamy) women

often played the role of emissaries between warring groups. This traditional role, however, could not be performed in the worst days of internecine fighting, due to the general risks involved and also because in Somalia from 1991 onward, sexual violence became a weapon of war. From peace-activists, some women developed into community workers and developers. They established hospitals, orphanages and schools and therefore contributed to some basic social rebuilding in war-torn settings such as Mogadishu, Merka or Hargeysa.

In the year 2000, when the Arta peace conference for Somalia was held in Djibouti, women made their ways into national politics. Asha Haji Elmi and other women activists persuaded rival political leaders of the five major Somali clans to allow women's participation in the conference. Their aim was to think beyond clan boundaries in drafting a peace agreement. They founded a group called the 'sixth clan' which, despite its name, helped women to transcend clan boundaries and gain political influence. While the sixth clan was not officially participating at the subsequent peace conferences in Kenya (2002-2004) and Djibouti (2008-2009), women continued to challenge men politically. At Arta they gained round 10 seats in parliament. At the following conferences their quota was increased to 12 per cent and in the current government (2012-) they are supposed to take 30 per cent of all seats in parliament. In fact, these quotas were so far never fulfilled, but still, they indicate the growing acceptance of women in politics. Additionally women gained local and national political positions in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia, with Somaliland featuring Edna Adan as first female foreign Minister in 2003 and Fowsia Yusuf Haji Aadan becoming Foreign Minister of Somalia and Deputy Prime Minister in 2012.

The most relevant transformation, however, took place in the economic sphere. During the civil war, many men were injured or killed; survivors lost their mind; many became jobless. Of course women suffered massively from the fighting too. But while many men either continued fighting or delved into chewing qaad (a mild stimulant traditionally consumed in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia) and thus, became economically unproductive (chewing qaad takes several hours and consumes vital family resources), women took over the feeding of their families. They opened


small shops or even bigger businesses or went abroad to apply for social welfare or work and send remittances. In this way, they became breadwinners of the family while still remaining prime care-takers of their children. This double burden is rarely acknowledged by Somali men. However, their economic activities certainly gave Somali women more freedom to care for themselves and more influence in the household.

Nonetheless, the transformations of gender roles emanating from the socio-political upheaval since 1991 did not (yet) lead to sustainable changes of the social structure. Particularly Somali politics are still embedded in the traditions of clanism and patriarchy, and the social status of women is generally still low, particularly in the more rural settings, notwithstanding women's tremendous engagement for improving the Somali condition.

## Conclusion

Despite the massive destruction and human and material costs of the civil war and the external military interventions in Somalia since 1991, the period of crisis in the Somali setting provided room for creative and innovative new constructions in the political, legal and social sphere.

In many regards, Somali ingenuity was simply a sign of resilience; it was necessary to cope with disaster and survive. However, the examples above can also be read positively as a way of 'reforming' Somali society from below (without any government or international plan to 'modernize' Somalia). Particularly the self-empowerment of women and the decentralization (or localization) of politics constitute tremendous reforms that had been long aspired to – at least officially – by post-colonial Somali governments, but were never pursued effectively against the massive resistance of men and certain 'noble' groups and corrupt politicians clinging to power and monopolizing state resources. Some of the transformations, mainly the emergence strong regional states such as Puntland and the de facto state of Somaliland (which actually sees itself as completely separate from the rest of Somalia) will be difficult to reverse. Also statutory law will have to compete with customary law for a long time in the delivery of justice for ordinary citizens. It is a major task of the current government in Mogadishu and its external supporters to find ways to accommodate these substantial transformations and to tie in with this creative potential of Somalis.



Städter: „Das sind Parlamentarier. Sie haben Geld erwartet, denn sie wollten Minister (Wasiirka) werden.“  
Nomade: „Somalier lieben Machtsitze.“



# Multilingual Somalia: Ploy or Pragmatic

Mohamed Haji Mukhtar

**S**omali people speak a number of languages and dialects, Maay<sup>1</sup> and Mahaa<sup>2</sup> being the lingua franca of the majority. None of the Somali languages and dialects was written until late 1972, due to

disagreements based on clan-related scripts or religious and political issues that dictated whether these Somali languages should be written in an Arabic- or a Latin-based alphabet.

In 1972, however, a Latin-based Mahaa script was adopted, and Mahaa became the only official national language of the country. This experiment alienated speakers of other Somali languages, especially Maay speakers who, in 1976, formed a literary association called Af-Yaal, "the language keepers" whose main concern was the protection and revival of Maay culture and language. By 1980, many of the members of Af-Yaal were jailed, harassed and killed by the Barre military administration forcing some into exile. It was the expatriate Af-Yaal that developed mostly new Maay scripts. Since 1994, one of those scripts Alif-Maay, the Maay Alphabet, has been circulated in Somali academic circles and found most suitable.<sup>3</sup>

This essay will discuss Alif-Maay, focusing on the historical background of languages and dialects of Somalia. Furthermore, the essay will explore and attempt to recover literature from the Maay heritage previously excluded for political reasons from the Somali literary canon.

## Historical Background

The Somali languages and dialects belong to the Eastern Cushitic sub-branch of the Afroasiatic family, they are related to languages such as the Saho-Afar spoken in the northeastern part of the Horn, Galla-

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Sidamo in southwestern Ethiopia and Omo-Tana in northeastern Kenya. Historical linguists have tentatively subdivided Somali languages and dialects into more than 20 groups. The

northern Somali people speak what is generally referred to as Af-Mahaa with dialectical variants. From the central regions to the south, Af-Maay is the dominant language, though there are other languages and dialects, who, however, use Af-Maay as a lingua franca. In business and religion, there are a large number of Arabic loan-words.<sup>4</sup> Since none of the Somali languages had a script, Arabic, English and Italian remained official languages in the former Somali Democratic Republic until 1972 when a modified Roman script was adopted for Af-Mahaa. Technical language is largely formed after Italian and English models.

## Arabic Models

In the 13th century, Barkadle Yusuf<sup>5</sup> adapted Arabic script for the transcription of Somali vowels to facilitate the teaching of the Qur'an in the duksi<sup>6</sup>. In the late 19th century, Sheikh Ibdille Issak (1796-1869)<sup>7</sup> and Sheikh Ahmad Gabyow (1844-1933)<sup>8</sup> made poetic and mnemonic translations from the Qur'an and the Hadith, but these translations were not written down until recently. Sheikh Uways Ibn Muhammad al-Barawi (1846-1907)<sup>9</sup> used Arabic script, when he printed his Af-Barawaani, Af-Maay and Af-Tunni qasa'id (poems). In 1938, Sheikh Muhammad Abdi Makahiil published an essay in the Issaq dialect using Arabic script. In the 1960s, both Ibrahim Hashi Mohamud (1929-1971) and Sa'id Usman Guleed promoted the use of the Arabic script.<sup>10</sup> However, Arabic models were not considered because Arabic vowels

do not correspond to the vowels in Somali languages, and other Arabic characters had to be modified. Most importantly, Arabic lost ground, as it did not have the characteristics of an indigenous script.

## Indigenous Models

In the late 1920s, Isman Yusuf Keenadiid, a Majerteen of the Darood clan developed a unique script known as Ismaniyya which, however, could be used only for the Af-Mahaa spoken in the northeast and, largely, in the central region. In 1933, Sheikh Abdirahman Sheikh Nuur Abdillahi (1900-1990) introduced another unique script known as the Gadabursi script. In the late 1940s, Mustaf Sheikh Hassan (1927-1983) of Hariin sub-clan of the Reewin devised a script to be used by those who spoke Af-Maay and related dialects known as the Kontonbarkadliyya ("Blessed Fifty"). In 1952, Hussein Sheikh Kadare of the Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye introduced the Kadariyya script. Although their own clans accepted these scripts, other clans would not. Kontonbarkadliyya and Kadariyya were neglected because neither the Abgaal nor the Reewin played significant roles in post-independent Somalia.

## Colonial Models

Christian missionaries developed Latin-based scripts. In 1897, Evangeliste de Larajasse and Cyprien de Sampont wrote a Practical Grammar of the Somali Language, which used a Latin orthography for Af-Mahaa. J. W. C. Kirk, in the British protectorate (1902-1904), recorded the Somali he heard and which he taught using a Latin script of his own invention, using some features of Arabic script. In 1905, Kirk published a grammar for the Yibir and Midgan dialects. Latin-based orthographies were examined by the Italian orientalist, Enrico Cerulli, and the linguists, Martino Moreno and Mario Maino in major publications.<sup>11</sup> During the trusteeship period (1950-1960), Italy brought the issue to the first Territorial Council (TC), which unanimously adopted Arabic as the official language of the country.<sup>12</sup> Radio Mogadishu, however, conducted broadcasts in both Af-Maay and Af-Mahaa until 1959 when the transitional government of the trust territory adopted a resolution limiting broadcasts only in Af-Mahaa. Thus, Somalia gained independence and unification in July 1, 1960 without a unified script for its languages.

## Post-Independent Efforts

The first civilian administration (1960-1964) set up a national language commission in October, 1960 to "investigate the best way of writing Somali, considering all the aspects of the language[s], with special eye on the technical side, and submit a report to the government by March, 1961" and to agree on one script suitable for all Somali languages. The commission was composed of nine members, most of whom with linguistic credentials, and who had invented their own scripts. Special consideration was also given to the representation of the different Somali languages and dialects. The commission found that the basic sounds of Somali languages were 44; thus, the future orthography should be represented accordingly.<sup>13</sup> The commission clearly stipulated in its report that the Upper Jubba "dialects," otherwise known as Af-Maay, had two or more phonemes unknown to other Somalis to be incorporated in the final script.<sup>14</sup> Among the guiding principles of the commission was that the future national orthography must respond to 17 questions, namely, among others: Is the script simple in its lettering? Is it unique[ly Somali]? Is it phonetic? Are any "printing machines," i.e. typewriters and presses available? Is it economically and technically viable? Has it any intrusive and anomalous diacritics? Has it any signs with more than one function?<sup>15</sup> It is important to bear in mind that the commission's concern was to agree on a script or orthography suitable for all Somali languages and dialects together.

The commission reviewed eighteen scripts, eleven indigenous, devised in unique Somali forms; four based on Arabic characters and three based on Latin characters. The Af-Maay script submitted by Mustaf Sheikh Hassan had 42 characters and was ranked the second of the eleven locally devised orthographies. The Arabic based scripts though acceptable for religious use did not meet the major requirements sketched out above. The Latin based scripts did satisfy most of these requirements, but as they were associated with colonialism and Christianity, their adoption was unlikely: Laatiin wa-laa Diin, "Latin is without God".

Political and religious factors complicated the deliberations and led three significant members to resign in protest because their scripts, Ismaniyya and Arabic respectively, did not meet the agreed upon criteria. Another important member, Mustaf Sheikh Hassan, a district commissioner and the only Af-Maay speaker

and an advocate of an Af-Maay script, was transferred from Mogadishu to Bal'ad and could not contribute to the work of the commission. Nevertheless, the commission could not come to a consensus, and the government decreed that Arabic, English and Italian remain official languages.

During the second civilian administration (1964-67), the government invited a committee of three foreign experts sponsored by UNESCO. The experts arrived in Mogadishu in March, 1966 to a city shaken with demonstrations hostile to the adoption of a Latin script. The UNESCO Committee reviewed existing scripts and interviewed most of their devisers. Although they could not come up with a specific recommendation, they were critical of indigenous and Arabic scripts and had few objections to Latin based scripts.<sup>16</sup>

In October 1969, the coup d'état led by Mohamed Siad Barre established a military administration, the Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC), which, in 1971, appointed the Guddiga Af-Somaliga, the Somali Language Commission without, however, specific instructions to recommend a script. The choice of a script would be political, and, indeed, on 21 October 1972, on the third anniversary of the coup, a helicopter dropped multicolor leaflets in a new Latin script over the parade passing before the tribuna of leaders and dignitaries. From that day on, this script became official, though few could read it. Af-Maay speakers, and speakers of other Somali languages, soon discovered that the script was only suitable for Af-Mahaa speakers, but all criticism was repressed in the name of cultural homogeneity and monolingualism. Thus, it was through the adoption of this script that one form of Somali, Af-Mahaa, became the only officially acceptable national language.

### Introducing a New Script

By 1974 a major literacy campaign was launched to teach nomadic Somalia, particularly the non-Mahaa speakers, how to read and write in the official form of Somali, Af-Mahaa. The ensuing literacy drive involved a national mobilization. Schools and colleges all over the nation were closed and some 25'000, almost the entire student population, were sent into the nomadic areas as teachers. To their astonishment, the Af-Maay speakers in the former Upper Jubba, Lower Jubba and Banadir regions (where the campaign was

concentrated) were told that Af-Mahaa was their mother tongue Afkiina hooyo. The motto of the campaign was sithi 'anaha qurquriya: "Drink it; it is smooth like milk": the Af-Maay choked. Nevertheless, Af-Mahaa became the language of instruction in all schools and the language of media and press.

The Af-Maay speaking regions were overwhelmed with schools, but students were denied the right to speak Af-Maay their true mother tongue in the school environs. First graders were anxious to go to pretty schools with playgrounds full of kids but were disturbed when they were told not to speak their mother tongue, Af-Maay. If they did, they were sent to the principal's office and spanked. Eventually, they dropped out of school or played truant. The result for the Af-Maay community was illiteracy and economic misery. A significant number of students tried to assimilate and "mother tongued" in Af-Mahaa as soon as possible. But still, they were called Eelay wiiq, "the devil Eelay" every day. They pretended they did not hear and suppressed their feelings and make all kinds of excuses and did not fight back. After they graduated and became "mother tongued," they became outcasts. Many young men accepted their imposed identity and even married non-Reewin wives, giving their children non-Af-Maay names. Many of them could no longer make sense in Af-Maay, not even to their relatives. They lowered themselves and humiliated their children when they forced them to speak Af-Mahaa only.

This was also true in meetings and public speeches. Speakers were reminded to always speak Af-Somali, meaning Af-Mahaa: Warya! Af-Somali ku hadal ('Hey! Speak Somali'). Siad Barre announced that civil servants had to learn the new script in three months. Before the coup, Af-Maay speakers had their own political parties and cultural associations and MPs in the National Assembly deliberated in Af-Maay which was then translated and transmitted through headphones as in the meetings of the United Nations. Indeed, debates and speeches in the parliament were in Arabic, Italian, English and local Somali languages. Before Af-Mahaa became Af-Somali, all students studied and were taught in Arabic, Italian and English. Ironically, learning and being taught in Af-Mahaa disadvantaged speakers of not only Af-Maay but all other Somali languages. It is evident that, before Af-Mahaa became the language

of instruction, Af-Maay speakers excelled because of their knowledge of writing and reading Arabic from the duksi Qur'anic schools, which was not usually the case for Af-Mahaa speakers. Af-Maay students had to study suugaanta Somalida, Somali literature, a course that dealt with poetry, story telling and cultural matters, but which excluded their own literature that was not even translated. The Af-Mahaa children's stories were not like the familiar stories they heard from their mothers, Gekogeko. "Once upon a time," nor were the riddles Diilleey, the ones they knew by heart. They did not memorize their own Reegay classical poetry. This suppression and official eradication of Af-Maay culture and literature was a major bone of contention and a cause of disenchantment and disunity under Siad Barre's regime. It also contributed to the demise of the Somali state itself.

When the military regime was overthrown in January 1991, the assertion of homogeneity came under attack. The Inter-Riverine Studies Association (ISA)<sup>17</sup> emerged in 1993, and, at its first congress, adopted a new, Latin-based script for Af-Maay called Alif-Maay, "Maay alphabet."<sup>18</sup>

### Cultural Renaissance

From independence to the fall of Siad Barre (1960-1991), the agro-pastoral Reewin who spoke Af-Maay were outside the traditional political system. Their language and culture were considered inferior. Little attention was given to the history and traditions of non-pastoral communities. However, the collapse of the state might well have been a blessing in disguise for agro-pastoral communities in the Riverine Region as well as elsewhere in the country. In 1991, the Fannaaniinta Arlaadi, an alliance of artists to preserve the Maay heritage of music, drama and poetry, was founded in Baidoa. Many of its members had been active since 1959 when Radio Mogadishu dropped Af-Maay programs in favor of Af-Mahaa. Previously, members of that alliance served in the civilian and military regimes as educators, civil servants, or soldiers. At the collapse of the Barre regime, in 1991, and the man-made famine and violence of the clan militias in the Inter-Riverine region, some poets began to speak out. A music teacher, Abdulkadir Ali Hassan, wrote a poem called Ay Tiringney Maghaagheng, Isly tiirineeng, "Let us save our name, and hold onto it proudly" to restore Maay pride. It was adopted as the

signature tune of Radio Baidoa, the first broadcast voice of Af-Maay, and the national anthem of the Riverine State founded in 1995.<sup>19</sup> The soldier Issak Nuuroow Eeding, a Reewin known by an Abgal name, Issak Abgaalow, wrote Mawqif Mujaahid, "The way of the warrior," and Isla Goroneeng, "Let us agree," poems which mobilized young men and women to defend their culture. Radio Baidoa broadcast Maay folk music, poetry, plays, and stories and, thus, served as a catalyst for Maay cultural revival. Indeed, Radio Baidoa was the first ever to broadcast and produce programs exclusively in Af-Maay.

Since 1992, the group Fannaaniinta Arlaadi has been producing a newsletter named, Arlaadi, "Homeland", irregularly published in Baidoa. They also produce videos of songs and plays. Moreover, they revived the publication and study of Af-Maay classical literature: Gopy, "poetry," Weeyr or Bayting, "war songs," Dheel, "dances," Adar, an oral Maay poetic genre dealing with animals, especially with camels, Naby Ammaang, and Dikri "religious poetry." They revived Gekogeko stories, sometimes set to music, and Diilleey riddles. In this context, a particularly old poem in Af-Maay regained popularity. Shoofin is a poem chanted by Kutaab, "Qur'anic school students," at the closing of a day session, a school anthem in the duksi tradition. Composed by the millenarian Sheikh Ibdirahman Issak (1796-1869)<sup>20</sup> in Af-Maay, the poem is chanted "to keep the devils at bay" – such is the meaning of the title. It has an epic sweep from Creation to the Day of Judgment and lays out fundamental spiritual and moral values.

### The Recognition of Af-Maay as Official Language

No decision is made in Somali affairs without the consideration of clan politics. The adoption of a modified Latin script for Af-Mahaa is a good example of clan intrigue. This script was created, modified, and propagated by Shire Jama Ahmed, member of Marehaan clan, in 1960. The Majerteen, the ruling clan of the time looked down on the Marehaan as reer baadiye, "Bedouins," and supported, under the guise of political correctness, the Ismaniyya script invented and propagated by Yassin Isman, a Majerteen. The Marehaan script was set aside as the Majerteen dominated Somali post-independence politics. The first Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (1960-64),

as well as the second one, Abdirizak Haji Hussein (1964-67), were Majerteen. Shermarke, who became the second President (1967-69), was assassinated only days before Barre's coup. As Barre was a Marehaan, it was not surprising that he should make Marehaan, a modified Latin script accommodating all Af-Mahaa speakers, the official national script.

Maay intellectuals have, since the mid-1970s, denounced the linguistic and cultural "genocide" of the Barre regime. The activities of the Af-Yaal, the language keepers, were celebrated in Mustaf Sheikh's poems such as Sheleedeya "sidelined" (1973) and Sahal Ma'allin Isse's Huburow "beloved" (1974), and Dooyow (1976).<sup>21</sup> My own Master's thesis (1973)<sup>22</sup> and Ph.D. dissertation (1983)<sup>23</sup> as well as my major published works<sup>24</sup> generated greater awareness about the plight of Af-Maay speakers.

Substantial changes also occurred in Somali Studies after the collapse of the Barre regime. Scholarship of the period, though focusing on the causes of the collapse of the Somali state and possible solutions, reported the social injustices suffered by the Af-Maay speaking people. Ali Jimale, *The Invention of Somalia*, demonstrated that the widely accepted history of Somalia was a political myth. Catherine Bestmen and Lee Cassanelli's collection of essays on the socio-economic causes of the civil war<sup>25</sup> provide ample evidence on what went wrong in Somalia and how Af-Maay speaking people were culturally and economically humiliated. Significant sociological studies include Virginia Luling's outstanding work on the Geledi Sultanate<sup>26</sup>; the late Bernhard Helander on the Hubeer clan<sup>27</sup>; and the anthropological study of the population and land use in inter-riverine Somalia by Ioan Lewis<sup>28</sup>. However, both civilian and military Somali governments discouraged foreign scholars from studying non-Af-Mahaa speaking regions. Indeed, they were harassed and denied visas.

Various studies expose the myth of Somalia's monolingualism: Marcello Lamberti<sup>29</sup> and John Saeed<sup>30</sup> explore linguistic and dialectal variations in Somalia. In 1998, Salim Alio Ibro contributed a Dictionary of the Jiddo language, and, in 2007, Mohamed H. Mukhtar and Omar M. Ahmed published the first English-Maay Dictionary exploring the roots of Af-Maay and its relationship to the other Somali languages and dialects.

The marginalization of agro-pastoral societies and their culture has been addressed by their representatives in the Somali national reconciliation conferences since the collapse of the state. Many of these Af-Maay defenders were assassinated or were blackmailed to such an extent that their lives were hardly bearable. However, the struggle continued. Truth eventually prevailed when the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference of 2003 at Mbegathi, Kenya, acknowledged that Af-Maay would be another official language of the Somali Republic. The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic of 2003 stated in Article 7: "The official language of the Somali Republic shall be Somali (Maay and Mahaatiri [Af-Mahaa])."

### Conclusion

In many religious traditions, the spoken word has creative power, but that word need not be confined to one language; thus, a diversity of languages and cultures is valued. In the Qur'an, the variety of linguistic expression among groups and individuals is seen as one sign of Allah's creative omnipotence: *wamin âyâtihî khalqu s-samâwâtî wal ardi wa-khtilafu alsinatikum wa-alwânikum inna fî dhâlika la-âyatîn lil-âlamîn*, "And among his signs is the creation of heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your colors; verily in that are signs for those who know" (Qur'an 30:22). Islam encourages multilingualism: *man ta'allama lughata qawmin amina min makrihim* "He who learns other people's language is safe from their mischief" (Hadith). Some cultures praise silence in given circumstances, as the wide-spread saying goes, "Speaking is silver; to be silent is gold." Others do not put an explicit emphasis on the role of language. But most place a high value on "speaking well": "knowing how to speak" was, and is, a sign of wisdom and high social status. Those in high places cultivate many forms of verbal and rhetorical art. Commonly, language and self-reflection – "I am what I say" – are seen as what makes people human, and identification with one's own native languages defines individual and group identity.

Somali society, like other oral societies, places a heavy weight on speaking well. To tell a person to speak proper Somali, "Af-Somali ku hadal" – an expression used by Af-Mahaa speakers to humiliate and degrade speakers of other Somali languages – in-

dicates the degree of exclusion of (for example) Af-Maay speakers, particularly after Af-Mahaa had been politically endorsed by the government under Siad Barre. Consequently, many non Af-Mahaa languages and dialects have either disappeared in recent decades or are at grave risk of extinction. Hostile governments actively suppress some; as larger languages spoken by politically more dominant groups replace others. Unless action is taken to support and foster linguistic diversity, many languages and dialects will cease to be spoken.

Somali scholarship so far has failed to note that the imposition of monolingualism on a multi-linguistic

people is a form of cultural and social oppression that contributed to the disunity of Somalia, which again paved a way for the continued collapse of the Somali state. The ethnocentric civilian and military regimes decreed that multi-culturalism, or the expression of multi-cultural issues, was treason. Now that Somali society is in disarray with no central authority, it is necessary to re-evaluate the diversity of Somali culture. Perhaps, at last, the arrogance and single-mindedness of monolingual empire builders will be condemned and cast aside, making space for a new and truly egalitarian Somali polity.

<sup>1</sup>Also known as Af-Maay, Af-Reewin, Maaymaay or Maayteri ("What did you say")? The language of Somalis south of the Shabelle Valley in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, Upper and Lower Juba regions, Northeastern Kenya and Southwestern Ethiopia and most of the Banadir. The Mahaa speakers, except for the urbanized and itinerant populations, do not understand Maay. Maay has no pharyngeal sounds, but there are nasals, fricatives and plosives.

<sup>2</sup>Commonly known as AF-Mahaa, or AF-Somali. The official language of the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1972. It is spoken widely in the central and northeastern and pockets of the Riverine Regions. Unlike Af-Maay, this language lacks nasal sounds and has distinctive pharyngeal phonemes.

<sup>3</sup>Abdullahi Haji Hassan, (Aw Soomow), et al. "Draft Outline of the Maay Alphabet: Alif-Maay." Paper presented to the First Inter-Riverine Studies Association Congress, Toronto, Canada, 4-5 November 1994.

<sup>4</sup>Andrzej Zaborski, "Arabic Loan-Words in Somali: Preliminary Survey" *Folia Orientalia* 8, (1967), 125-175.

<sup>5</sup>A saint remembered for his system rendering Arabic vowel sounds into Af-Maay Somali vowel ones. See Mukhtar, Mohamed Haji, *Historical Dictionary of Somalia*, New Edition. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2003. pp 54-55.

<sup>6</sup>Qur'anic schools similar to the madrasah or kuttab schools in Islamic Arabia.

<sup>7</sup>A millenarian and catechismal poet and an erudite Islamic scholar proficient in Arabic and Maay languages. Sheikh Ibdille developed a teaching technique to explain and translate the shari'a laws from Arabic to Af-Maay. See Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary*, *ibid.* pp 136-37, 211-12, 22-23.

<sup>8</sup>A poet-Sheikh who composed many Masafito "catechism poems" ranging from the hanuunin "inspirational" to digniin "admonitory." In the early days of Italian colonial rule, Sheikh Ahmed Gabyow composed patriotic poems defending country and faith. See Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary*, *ibid.* pp 204-05.

<sup>9</sup>The reviver of the Qadiriyya order and the founder of the Uwaisiyya branch. In addition to his sufi mystic powers, Sheikh Uwais was a multi-lingual poet. He composed religious poems and addressed congregations in Tunni, his mother tongue, Arabic, Maay, Mahaa, and Chimbalaazi.

<sup>10</sup>See Ibrahim Hashi Mohamud, *al-Sumaliyyah bi-Lughat al-Qur'an: Muwalah Wataniyyah li-Kitaabat Lughat al-Um*. "Somali in the language of the Qur'an: patriotic attempt to write the mother tongue." Cairo: Dar al-Tiba'ah al-Hadithah, 1963, and Sa'id Usman Guleed, *Alfaz Arabiyyah fi al-Lughah al-Sumaliyyah: Bathh Maydaani*. (Arabic words in the Somali language: A field study). Both scholars advocated official adoption of Arabic script.

<sup>11</sup>See Cerulli, Enrico. *Somalia Scritti Vari Editi ed Inediti*. 3 volumes, Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1957, 1959, 1964; Moreno, Martino. *Il Somalo della Somalia: Grammatica e Testi del Benadir, Darood e Dighil*. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1955; and Maino, Mario. *La Lingua Somala Strumento di Insegnamento Professionale*. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1953.

<sup>12</sup>The council adopted its resolution on February 2, 1951. See "Copia del verbale di Riunione No. 8 Del 2 Febbraio 1951" in *Somaliya: Antologia Storico-Culturale*. Occasional Journal of the Cultural department of the Ministry of Education. (June, 1969), 47-50.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.* 22

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.* 22.

<sup>15</sup>For further details see Report, *ibid.* 11-12.

<sup>16</sup>B.W.Andrzejewski, S. Strelcyn and J. Tubiana, "Somalia: The Writing of Somali," UNESCO, Paris, August 1966. (ws/0866.90 (CLT)).

<sup>17</sup>This association founded on 5 December 1993 in Worcester, Massachusetts,

is committed to the re-examination of socio-cultural assumptions in Somali studies. It held its first Congress at the University of Toronto, Canada on 4 November 1994, and publishes *Demenedung*, a quarterly newsletter.

<sup>18</sup>Mohamed H. Mukhtar, "Ali-Maay: Ploy or Pragmatic?" *Demenedung*, Newsletter of the Inter-Riverine Studies Association, vol. 1. No. 4 (1997), 5-6. This bicameral council known as the Digiil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council (DMS-GC) was created in March 1995 as an interim legislative body of an autonomous Reewin State. It had two houses; the House of Representative presided first by Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, then by Dr. Hassan Ibrahim known as Hassey, and the House of Elders, called the Supreme Traditional Council of Chiefs (STCC) chaired by Malak Mukhtar Malak Hassan. However, the council's life was cut short on September 17, 1995 after the invasion of Baidoa by the warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of Somali National Alliance (SNA). Further details, see Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, "The Plight of the Agro-Pastoral Society of Somalia," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 70 (1996), 552-553.

<sup>19</sup>See note 7

<sup>20</sup>Sahal Ma'allin Isse graduated from the '11 January High School' in Baidoa in 1974. Already during his school years he wrote and composed poems in Af-Maay. He then joined the Somali National Security (NSS). In between 1973-1976 he completed Huburow series that dealt with mixture of love stories and patriotic songs. The military regime accused him of being Ka'aandiid "traitor and anti-revolution". He then deserted the NSS and sneaked to Yemen as political asylee. In late 1980s, he moved to Cairo, Egypt. He got seriously ill in the early 1990s and brought to London, UK for medical assistance where he currently lives.

<sup>21</sup>Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, "Tarikh al-Ist'mar al-Itali fi al-Sumal Hatta 1908," *The History of Italian Colonialism in Somalia Until 1908*, M.A. Thesis, Al-Azhar University, Cairo, 1973.

<sup>22</sup>Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, "Al-Sumal al-Itali fi Fatrat al-Wisayah Hatta al-Istiqalal 1950-1960," *Italian Somaliland from trusteeship to independence 1950-1960*. Ph.D. dissertation, Al-Azhar University, Cairo, 1983.

<sup>23</sup>"The Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia from 1947-1960 (Independence)". *Ufahamu* 17, no. 2 (Spring 1989), 75-95. "Islam in Somali History Fact and Fiction," *In The Invention of Somalia*, edited by Ali Jimale Ahmed, 1-27. (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995).

<sup>24</sup>"The Plight of Agro-Pastoral Society of Somalia," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 70 (1996), 543-553. Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, and Omar Moalim Ahmed, *English-Maay Dictionary*, (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd., 2007).

<sup>25</sup>Catherine Bestmen and Lee Cassanelli (ed.), *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>26</sup>Virginia Luling, *Somali Sultanate: The Geledi City-State Over 150 Years*, (London: HAAN, 2002).

<sup>27</sup>Bernhard Helander, "The Hubeer in the Land of Plenty: Land, Labor, and Vulnerability among a Southern Somali Clan," *In The Struggle for Land*, *Ibid.* 47-69.

<sup>28</sup>Ioan Lewis, *Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali Afar and Saho*, New Edition, (London: HAAN, 1994).

<sup>29</sup>Marcello Lamberti, *Somali Dialects*, *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>John I. Saeed, "Dialectical Variation in Somali," *In Proceedings of the First International Congress of Somali Studies*, edited by Hussein Adam and Charles Gesheker, 464-91, (Atlanta: Scholars, 1992).

# Emerging Trends of Political Islam

Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

A militant group affiliated to al-Qaida controlling large swathes in Somalia known as Al-Shabab (the Youth) has been creating havoc in the whole region of the Horn of Africa. The recent terrorist action in the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi caught the attention

of the world community to the dangers looming in the region and reaffirmed that terrorism has no religion and ethnicity. Even though Somalis have been suffering terrorism and massive violence of human rights in the last two decades, all Somalis are considered and shunned as potential terrorists. Despite the fact that Western scholarship on political Islam has increased exponentially after 9/11, yet writing from the inside outwards is of paramount importance and may offer added value. First, this article will put the topic in its geographical and historical context and then it will trace trends and persuasions of political Islam, connecting them to their root organization and core ideology.

## Background

Somalia is a Muslim country located in the strategic Horn of Africa connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa. The country was constituted from the unification of the former British protectorate in the North and the Italian trusteeship administration that gained independence in 1960. However, this state totally collapsed in 1991, ushering in gross violations of human rights, a massive refugee crisis and the emergence of Islamic extremism and piracy. There is no single causal explanation for the state's collapse in Somalia. Various schools of thought tend to explain

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the collapse of the state in different perspectives. These perspectives include the Cold War and foreign aid, Somali irredentism and the war with Ethiopia (1977-78), archaism, the overextension of resources, moral degradation and eclectic factors.

However, the mismatch

between the modern secular state and traditional society could be considered the original cause. Strangely, Somalia is the longest failed state even though it enjoys all unifying factors such as a common language and religion. The homogeneous Somali ethnic group estimated to be more than 20 million people is scattered in four countries namely: Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, more than a million Somalis live in the Diaspora mostly in Europe and North America. Moreover, only half of the Somali ethnic group resides within the territory of the Somali Federal State.

Islam was introduced to Somalia from the Arabian Peninsula in the late 800s and the process of mass conversion of Somalis to Islam occurred between the 11th and 13th centuries. Nonetheless, the country remained peripheral and was not incorporated into successive Muslim states until 17th century, when the Ottoman Empire seized parts of northern Somalia. In the 19th century, Somalia experienced a reform and revival of Islam associated with the reorientation and renaissance of the Sufi brotherhoods (SB). The advent of Sufism was recorded from the early 15th century on, nevertheless, its renewal and reform were noted from the last quarter of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. SBs have taken mainly peaceful approaches to socio-religious reform through Islamic

propagation and spiritual revitalization. As such, they have dominated religious life, reaching out to populations in the urban and rural areas alike, most of who had identified with one of the SBs by the 19th century.

There are two main SBs in Somalia, the Qadiriyyah and the Ahmadiyah, and each one has its local offshoots. Thus the Qadiriyyah has two main branches, Zayliyyah and Uweysiyyah, while the Ahmadiyah also has three offshoots, Rahmaniyyah, Salihyyah, and Dandarawiyah. The colonial domination at the end of the 19th century introduced the European model of the state and interjected alien culture into the traditional Muslim society. In response, Islam was used as the ideology of resistance by the Islamic scholars belonging to some SBs. The most renowned is Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, who founded the Darwish movement and fought Britain from 1900-1920. During the struggle for independence, Islam also became part of the nationalist expression of national identity and an anti-colonial resistance slogan in combination with nascent nationalism. This phenomenon was evident since 1950s and the modern Islamic trends were developing, brought by Somalis studying in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, besides the Egyptian mission of spreading Arab nationalism and the Arabic language in Somalia. Also, local Islamic organizations began to appear such as the Islamic League.

After the independence in 1960, within the local, regional, and global context of the Cold War, regional competition and transformation of Somali society, Islamic consciousness was gradually growing along with the growing westernization of the elites. This growth manifested itself both in the emergence of modern Islamist scholars educated in Arab universities and marginalized in the job market and in the proliferation of Arabic schools, books, newspapers, and libraries. The growth of the Islamist elites and their rejection of marginalization led to increased Islamic activities and the eventual establishment of more robust organizations. At the same time, westernization and secularization were also growing. Thus, the gap between the two camps was gradually widening.

The first modern Islamic organizations began to appear in the mid 1960s; they were mainly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideology. The most significant role was played during this period by the Nahdah Islamic organization and the student organizations of Ahal in Southern Somalia and Al-Wahdah

in Northern Somalia. At the same time, Salafism was also growing with the increase of Saudi influence achieved through the opening of educational programs involving local schools and scholarships to Saudi Universities. It is important, however, to characterize this period of the Islamic awakening in 1960-1970s as immature with an emotional attachment to Islamic ideology. It was a period with very low organizational capacity, meager economic resources, and a romantic approach to social and political realities. Nonetheless, by the end of 1970s, more robust Islamic organizations were established. These organizations were not monolithic and pursued various Islamic propagation methodologies and strategies ranging from peaceful evolutionary to violent revolutionary.

## Political Islam in Somalia

Political Islam or Islamism is a controversial term defined differently as part of the various terminologies coined by Western scholars to denote the modern development of Islamic movements. This paper adopts the International Crisis Group's definition because of its broadness, that is, «the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character». Islamism pose challenges both the post-colonial secular state by advocating its Islamization and the traditional society by preaching Puritanism, reforms and revivalism. Currents of ideas and groups belonging to this category are numerous and diversified. However, in Somalia, the two main conceptions of Islamism are rooted in Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. The unique attributes of Somali Islamism have grown in a specific environment and thus acquired distinctive characteristics. The first characteristic stems from the fact that Somalia never experienced in its long history the rule of the Islamic state. Notwithstanding its various communities' incorporation of selective parts of Shari'a in their customary laws known as Xeer, full application of Islamic Shari'a was never practiced. This means that there are no local memories of Islamic rule or historical legacies from which contemporary Islamists can draw inspiration and examples. The second character is that Islamic propagation and its institutions are handled by individuals and non-state institutions without state intervention. These institutions, such as Qur'anic schools, mosques and education circles, are established by various

individuals or groups. Besides the unique merits of this system due to its sustainability and mobility, its limitations, nonetheless, remain, such as small size, fragmentation and lack of standardization. The third characteristic is the leadership style of the traditional Islamic establishment, based on authoritarian relations of a master-disciple nature. In such societal organizational culture, the goal of modern Islamic movements to establish larger trans-clan organizations with modern organizational settings is hard to realize. It is very difficult to transcend the incompatibility between traditional organizational models and modern organizations, based on hierarchical and institutional loyalties. These inherent organizational weaknesses haunt modern Islamic movements and are the primary cause of their recurrent fragmentation and splintering. Thus, the concept of a modern Islamic organization based on memberships that offer loyalty not to individuals but to the organization's principles, procedures, and policies is a new venture and, indeed, a revolutionary idea in Somalia.

Moreover, the Somali Islamic movements take advantage of a number of opportunities. The first advantage is the absence of considerable religious minorities, which might pose an obstacle to the adoption of the Islamic Shari'a. The second advantage is the lack of organized secular elites that might oppose an Islamic agenda on the domestic front. The third advantage is the freedom of operations Islamic movements enjoyed after the collapse of the repressive state in 1991. Indeed, Somalia is an unprecedented case in modern history, in which Islamists have been operating freely and openly without the intervention of the post-colonial secular state since that date. As a result, the country became a fertile breeding ground for the growth of various persuasions of Islamism including some violent groups like Al-Shabab.

### Emerging Trends of Political Islam

As part of its modern development, the Salafiya School appeared in Somalia in the second half of the twentieth century and grew exponentially in the 1980s. The terminology of Salafiya is highly contentious and is used differently by various schools and scholars. It was introduced to Somalia as part of the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in global politics, and it spread into Somalia through students who were educated in the Saudi Islamic universities and also

through the Somali migrant labor force working in Saudi Arabia during the economic boom of the 1970s. Many graduates of the Saudi Islamic universities were employed to spread Salafism in Somalia and were provided with enormous resources such as ample Islamic literature, new spacious mosques and other incentives like scholarships and training courses. Numerous organizations belong to the Salafiya persuasions. The mother organization is Al-Ittihad Al-Islami which splintered after the militant period of 1990s into more than four organizations. The prominent ones among them are Al-I'tisam and Al-Shabab. The most notorious extremist organization within Al-Shabab is a mixture of Salafiya Jihadist and Takfir elements.

The second modern development is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, which reached Somalia in 1953 through Egyptian teachers and then via Somali students who graduated from the Arab universities. The MB, promoting Muslim unity among various groups, adopted the slogan, "We should unite upon that which we agree, and excuse each other in that which we disagree." In this context, followers of the MB methodology avoid divisive Islamic discourses on doctrinal matters and legal aspects within its association. Indeed, its main approach aims to create an atmosphere of collaboration between various Islamic groups and organizations to serve the bigger goals: the promotion of Islam in society and its application at state level. Prominent organizations belonging to these persuasions are the Islah Movement and its offshoot «Dam Jadid» (New Blood) and Al-Tajammu' al-Islami (Aala-Sheikh).

The third modern Islamic development is Tablighi Jama'a, which originated from the Indian subcontinent where it emerged in 1926. It does not focus on political reform and is generally a quietist movement to which a large group of religious preachers in Somalia belong. The Jama'a uses the simplified approach of calling to Islam by sending a group of people to various cities, villages and locations to propagate Islam. The procedures of the call to Islam start with calling people to the congregation prayers in the mosques and then inviting them to stay and listen to their Islamic message after prayers. The Jama'a has succeeded in influencing the uneducated masses because of its teaching's simplicity, community spirit and openness.

These trends are not the invention of the Somalis

and are linked with the global trends which are part of the world-wide revival of Islam in the twentieth century. The influence of these Islamic trends in shaping the Somalis' social realities and political views is tremendous. For instance, in all National Charters and Constitutions adopted since 2000, Islam has been affirmed as the ultimate reference of all laws and any laws contradicting Islamic principles have been proclaimed illegal. Moreover, there are considerable numbers of MPs belonging to all Islamic trends among the members of parliament selected through traditional clan elders. However, the common denominator of all Islamic trends is to advocate for the application of Shari'a in Somalia. The application of Shari'a is constitutionally sanctioned, yet, its application should be in accordance with moderate interpretation of Islamic texts and a gradual application that averts factionalism and extremism. This approach is realized through the participatory approach of all groups belonging to the various Islamic trends, including the Sufi brother-

hoods, in order to create consensus among Somali Islamic scholars on matters of Islam.

In conclusion, Somalia is currently passing through a post-transition period attempting to put behind it the protracted transition period of 12 years and the brutal civil war that has persisted since 1991. However, this herculean task is very challenging. My personal dream is to see Somalia regain its statehood and unity while preserving its cultural heritage and societal values. Moreover, Somalia should attain the socio-economic development that is a necessary pre-condition for transforming the country into a modern responsible state. During the protracted civil war, Somali people have experienced various forms of extremisms in the name of their clans and Islam. Clan belonging and Islam are the basis for Somali identity and without integrating them into nationalism, the state will not be sustainable. That is the challenge of reconstructing the national state of Somalia.



Pressekonferenz der Ministerin für Erziehung und Gesundheit (Sommer 2013):

„Wir hören jeden Tag, dass junge Frauen für Geld sagen, sie seien von somalischem Militär vergewaltigt worden. Das ist eine Lüge, die wir nicht dulden können. Auch wenn es wahr ist, wir müssen es verschweigen.“

Städter: „Was ist nur los mit der Sheekhada. Von ihr erwarten wir doch, dass sie die somalischen Frauen schützt.“

Nomade: „Es wäre besser gewesen, sie hätte geschwiegen.“

# Youth in Somaliland: Education and Employment

Nimo-ilhan Ali

Somaliland is, in many ways, very similar to many other small sub-Saharan African countries. The streets of Hargeisa, the capital city, are booming with vibrant activities of small-scale busi-

nessmen and women, construction sites and with countless number of billboards advertising education institutions. In fact, if it were not for the equally as numerous billboards signs announcing the work of different types of local and international NGOs, one could easily forget that a little over twenty years ago, these streets were scenes of overwhelming physical destruction, displaced people and countless number of young people roaming around with AK47s. In effect, in 1991 when Somaliland broke away from its union with the former Italian colony and the state of Somalia, and adopted the colonial borders of the Somaliland British Protectorate of 1884-1960, reconstruction processes had to start from the ground. Lacking international recognition, the bulk of financial and intellectual responsibility for social, economic and political reconstruction processes fell on the shoulders of local communities and the Somaliland diaspora.

Two decades on, Somaliland is still internationally unrecognised. This places severe economic constraints on the territory: lack of recognition means that Somaliland does not qualify to borrow from bilateral and multilateral agencies and this restricts the country's ability to carry out much-needed large scale infrastructure projects such as roads, irrigation dams and electricity grids. Foreign direct investment inflows are rare as foreign investors are reluctant whilst local entrepreneurs' access to credit markets outside the country is difficult. Crucially, it also me-

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ans Somaliland cannot participate in international fora for the developing of treaties on trade, maritime resource use, and law enforcement. Nevertheless, even with these major structural constraints, Somaliland has managed to make positive progress towards economic growth.

Still, there remain major challenges for Somaliland. One of the most significant of these is widespread unemployment. A recent labour market survey conducted in three districts of Somaliland by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) finds that over 70 percent of the population is unemployed. Given the demographic youth bulge, two of every three Somalilanders are under thirty years old; it is not a surprise that youth (aged between 15 and 30) are overly represented as unemployed persons. The situation for the urban youth is more severe than that of rural youth in the country – this is to be expected as youth continue to migrate to the towns and cities and the skills mismatch between what young people are able to do and the needs of an evolving economy continue to be exacerbated. It is worth noting here that youth unemployment is by no means unique to Somaliland – many countries in Africa and even in the OECD face a similar conundrum.

To address this challenge, the Government of Somaliland (GoSL) in January 2013 initiated a national employment strategy with an objective of finding ways to ways to further develop, restructure where necessary and appropriate, and transform the Somaliland economy into a sustainable and equitable economy capable of generating decent employment for all Somalilanders. A vital part of this process was to understand the extent of youth employment and un-

employment taking into account regional specificities. The administration recognised that to fully appreciate the intricacies of the economy and the labour markets and to be able to formulate coordinated and targeted employment policy programmes and interventions, engagement with Somalilanders from all walks of life across all regions of Somaliland was paramount. With this in mind, the process started by engaging with regional stakeholders in six major cities in Somaliland – Las Canod, Cerigabo, Burco, Berbera, Hargeisa and Borama. The completion of regional consultations led to a national employment conference in Hargeisa in July 2013 where all stakeholders were brought together at the national level to discuss short, medium and long-term employment strategies.

In this brief text I will outline the employment situation of youth in Somaliland based on the findings from the national employment strategy mentioned above and from my research in the country. I will focus on the labour market outcomes of educated youth. By this I mean young men and women who are graduating in large numbers each year from the many universities in Somaliland. My definition of education here only covers the fact that these young people have been awarded degree certificates by higher education institutions and considers neither the pedagogy practices of these institutions nor the qualitative descriptions of what it actually means to be educated in the Somaliland context. I spent 10 months in 2012-2013 conducting research with this group in particular. Despite their heterogeneity, one thing that educated Somaliland youth seem to have in common is the social status attached to having a university degree which tends to allow them to negotiate entry to different social clusters. Following on from this, it is possible to say, albeit with caution, that their situation in general terms is better compared to youth who have not graduated from universities.

## What does it mean to be unemployed in Somaliland?

One of the difficulties with employment statistics is that they tend to show only the general situation and offer little on the specifics and the human side to employment experiences on the ground. For example, although the statistics in Somaliland put youth unemployment at 75 percent (ILO, 2013), this figure does not tell us whether the 25 percent of employed youth

are fully employed and whether their jobs allow them to secure decent livelihoods. Similarly, the figures do not tell us whether the 75 percent of the unemployed youth are actively looking for work or not. In addition, these figures are far removed from the social realities on the ground and what it actually means to be employed or unemployed in Somaliland.

Employment and unemployment are in many ways social concepts embedded in complex social (and cultural) relationships that go beyond a dichotomized definition. In a recent interview in Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, a young man pointed out to me that being unemployed meant that even though he is approaching thirty years old, he still lives with his parents and is not able to get married “no girl wants to marry me as I cannot provide for them... I don't know when I will be able to fulfil one of the most important aspects of being a man, supporting and taking care of my wife and children.” (Interview, April 2013). Another pointed out that he no longer likes to go outside stating “everyone who knows me – neighbours, old teachers, friends' parents, want to know where I work. Telling them I still don't have a job, and I have graduated from university two years ago, is difficult” (June 2013).

It is important to note when talking about Somaliland youth and their experiences that the term ‘youth’ in any context is not a homogenous concept. Crucial differences exist in the socio-economic background of youth and these differences play a determining role in the labour market outcomes of particular groups. For example, given the fact that the majority of social services are available in urban rather than rural areas, youth in urban Somaliland tend to have better access to education and subsequently to employment. Moreover, education and labour market outcomes for female youth are very different from those of male youth regardless of where they reside. In addition, if we analyse the social structure where clan plays a huge role in the day-to-day life of an average Somalilander, membership in a particular clan can also have significant influence on youth experiences in the labour market. These differences mean that youth-related employment analysis should be nuanced and contextualised and take into account not only geographical locations but also the socio-economic status of youth.

## Youth and higher education

As pointed out earlier, one increasingly noticeable feature on the streets of Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, is the large number of billboards advertising education institutions – mainly universities offering courses from Bachelors in Business Administration to Masters in Engineering Management. In fact, in Hargeisa alone, a city of estimated 725,000 people, 14 universities are competing aggressively to attract young people. For Somaliland as whole, 23 universities were registered with the higher education commission as of March 2013. To put in perspective, these 23 universities are mainly catering for a small portion of the 45 percent of the estimated 4.1 million Somalilanders who are urban and rural dwellers. The remaining 55 percent are nomads who spend their days following the grazing routes with their camels – arguably the most valuable and cherished creature in the Somali culture reflected in the many sayings and poems dedicated to them!


The expansion of the higher education and education in general in Somaliland has been especially remarkable in the last ten years. Reconstruction of the sector had to start from scratch as the majority of the schools, especially those in Hargeisa and Burco, the two largest cities, were completely destroyed during the Somalia Air Force's bombings in the late 1980s and the subsequent civil wars from 1988-91 and 1994-96. The destruction went further than the physical buildings. The majority of the educated cadre were either killed during the war or fled and became refugees outside the country.

Faced with a new and fairly weak international-ly-unrecognised government, coupled with a very small number of people with experience in manage-


ment of education, the community, with the help of the Somaliland diaspora, had to rise to the challenge of filling this gap. They had to learn very quickly how to take on the traditional role of the state in the provision of this social service. Fast-forward to the present, education across all levels has evolved from community led initiatives to a big business with new players, including those from neighbouring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda), constantly entering the market. Demand for education, given the current demographic trend, is unprecedented.

The mushrooming of educational institutions means that the majority of Somaliland youth now have more access to education, including higher education, compared to a decade ago. As the graphs below depict, the number of primary and secondary schools has been increasing steadily. Similarly, the number of students enrolled and that of teachers have also increased. Although still lagging behind somewhat, girls' enrolment rates also continue to grow. A point to note here is that even though in aggregate the number of educational institutions continues to grow in Somaliland, this growth is not uniform across the country. There are significant differences between rural and urban areas and between Hargeisa, the capital, and the rest of the country. These differences mean that young people in rural areas of Somaliland have limited access to education, at all levels, compared to those located in urban areas, especially those located in Hargeisa, Borama or Burco.

At the outset, the expansion of education, specifically higher education, should be good news for any country, and more so for Somaliland given its recent history of conflict and displacement. This is also true given the global knowledge-based economy where the ability and speed of workers to adopt technology from other countries determines to a great extent productivity increases and thus economic growth. But, we have to be careful here; for a country to be able to fully utilise the advantages of globalisation and the much-hyped knowledge transfers, many other factors need to be



Source: Graph created by author using data from Somaliland In Figures 9th Edition (2011). Data for 2006/2007 was not available



Source: Graph created by author using data from Somaliland In Figures 9th Edition (2011)

considered. The development stage of a country and its economic structures are amongst the vital factors. For Somaliland, tangible outcomes of its optimistic participation in the globalised economy can be seen in the increased imports of eggs from Yemen, chicken from Brazil and canned fish from Vietnam. These are household consumption items that can be sourced in abundance in the country.

Similar to its fully open economy, the higher education market is also liberalised, with players from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda frequently establishing university franchises with their Somaliland partners. Together with other locally-established public and private institutions, a large number of young Somalilander graduates enter the labour markets every year. For example, in 2011, 1135 students graduated from the three big universities in Hargeisa (University of Hargeisa, Golis and Admas). Approximately 28 percent of these graduates were females. In regards to faculties, about 64 percent of all graduates were awarded variants of business administration and information and communication technology-related degrees. The concentration of students in these two faculties is evident across all universities in the country. To understand the full implication of this concentration, the next section briefly analyses the Somaliland economy and questions the correlation between the skills graduates are entering the markets with and the human resource needs of the economy.

## Somaliland economy

Looking at the structure of the Somaliland economy and its current development stage, the relevance of higher education sector at its current form becomes questionable. Somaliland economy is a fully-liberalised market economy that depends heavily on the

export of livestock to the gulf markets. Agriculture, mainly livestock constitutes approximately 59 percent of the Somaliland GDP with the service and industry sector contributing 34 and 7 percent respectively. The heavy export concentration on the livestock sector to a more or less single market is problematic not only in the inherent volatility given the nature of the sector (in the past the trade has been disrupted by bans by Gulf countries on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa due to fears of Rift Valley Fever), but also in the heavy dependence on a single buyer. Further, this sector has very limited job creation capacity as it mainly exports live animals and has not diversified into the export of secondary value added products.

On the manufacturing side, apart from the few bottled water industries, the sector is crucially under-developed. The large-scale foreign direct investment needed to bring to life sectors such as fishing, mining, and tourism, all with significant potential for job creation, are difficult to find. Even with ample investment opportunities in the country, non-Somali foreign investors are cautious, thanks to Somaliland's peculiar political status.

One of the most important features of the Somaliland economy which has shown both growth and resilience is the micro, small and medium size enterprises (MSME) sector – key words here “micro” and “small”. This definition of the sector ignores the usual formal and informal dichotomy. In fact, in the Somaliland context, the line between formal and informal MSMEs is blurred and not that relevant. The MSME sector in many ways reflects the entrepreneurial energy of the average Somali man and woman and although relatively small, it has been a vital sector in employment creation. However, the sector faces significant constraints (lack of access to financial

support – apart from the limited banking services by the money transfer companies, Somaliland does not have a banking sector, high costs of electricity, limited roads connecting to market centres, lack of skilled employees, difficult and ambiguous licencing and taxing requirements) and generally operates in a difficult and very competitive environment.

Some of these constraints can be quite severe and prohibit the growth of business. For example, a restaurant owner in Baki, a farm village in the west of the country, recently pointed out to me that the high cost of diesel means he can only turn on his generator five hours a day. This restricts both his ability to store the large volume of food items needed to respond to demand and the number of hours he can operate his business. Another resident, a farmer, showed me a large truck standing idly and said that because of the bad roads and the heavy rains, he could not transfer his watermelon harvest to the market in Borama (the nearby city). He was left with hundreds of watermelon quietly rotting in the truck (Interviews in Baki, Awdal August 2013).

### What does this mean to youth with a university degree?

The present structure of the Somaliland economy tells us that there are significant structural constraints that impact the ability of the economy to create employment and thus directly impacts the ability of youth to secure jobs. However, it is also true that the economy is producing, albeit limited, jobs especially those related to the MSME sector. The implication here is that the type of skills needed are those that supports MSME development such construction workers, electricians, carpenters, engineers, and other related technical and vocational skills. At the present time there is a crucial shortage of these skills. An owner of an electric company reported in a recent interview that “when a generator breaks down, I have to fly a technician from Kenya or Ethiopia... this is very costly for me.” (Burao, June 2013).

This economic and labour market reality is not in line with what the universities are producing. As pointed earlier, the trend across all universities across the country is the heavy concentration of students in business and computer-related faculties. Of course the economy does indeed need accountants and managers, but the numbers graduating each year with these

degrees far outweigh the demand in the labour markets. My conversations with university managements across three regions in Somaliland highlighted that these universities are acutely aware of the prevailing mismatch but are constrained by the lack of sufficient funding to allow them to recruit qualified teachers and equip their laboratories with the expensive kits needed for the science/technical faculties.

Taking the above into account, it is important to note that the value of education and higher education in particular, for youth goes beyond labour market outcomes. Being a post-conflict country, having young people from different regions of Somaliland studying together and exchanging ideas can build social cohesion and understanding. In addition, given the high status placed on higher education, a youth with a university degree tends to feel respected and trusted which could lead to youth being more involved in other aspects of society such as politics. Of course one of the caveats here is that, similar to the labour markets, the pedagogy practices at universities have to be attuned to the needs of the society and of quality not to undermine the current respect for the qualification. In other words, universities have to be embedded in society and reflect the society accordingly. However, given the current trend where the entry costs and requirements to create a university are relatively low and demand unprecedented, the incentives for universities to do more than the bare minimum is limited. With funding constraints, limited faculty and facility capacities and high competition, universities crucially need financial and intellectual support to allow them to look beyond student numbers and to start thinking about their role in the social and economic development of Somaliland.

### Youth experiences in the labour markets

Apart from the apparent mismatch between the skills needed in the labour markets and those being produced by the higher education institutions, there are other specific labour markets and social and cultural processes that accentuate youth unemployment outcomes across the regions.

Firstly, across all Somaliland regions, there is generally very limited flow of information between job seekers and employers and most young seekers do not know where the jobs are. Somaliland remains a predominantly oral society which means information

flows about jobs hardly move outside friends and clan circles. Apart from a few job adverts from the government and the international development organisations, not many jobs are posted in public domains. A young man told me in an interview that “I finished my money printing CVs and finished my shoes walking around asking from one office to another whether they have any openings” (Hargeisa, August 2013). For female youth, finding the time to look for work in this environment is extremely difficult given their day-to-day responsibilities in the households.

Secondly, difficulties in the recruitment processes make youth give up early on in their search. Even for the few jobs that are posted in the public domains, youth often face difficulties applying as they fail to meet the arduous experience requirements. In addition, many find it difficult to follow the recruitment process – creating CVs and writing cover letters in English, even with a university degree, proves very difficult for the majority of graduates in Somaliland.

Thirdly, my discussions with university graduates in Somaliland highlighted that unemployed graduates do not always actively look for work. The assumptions that there are no jobs in the economy (possibly because youth do not know where jobs are or how to access them), and the general-accepted wisdom amongst the young that the few jobs available are offered along clan lines, discourages youth from looking for a job. In addition, the majority of unemployed graduates I spoke with are only willing to work in the ‘suit-and-tie’ office jobs of large organisations – usually the NGO sector and the few large telecommunication and remittance companies, and are not willing to look for work in the MSME sector where jobs are actually being created. It is plausible this is due to the extremely high social status attached to a university education. The graduates’ expectations of the value of university education seem to be in constant conflict with the labour market reality. This of course raises questions about the extent to which universities prepare these young people to enter the labour markets.

Finally, the structure of the Somali society where qabiil or clan plays a crucial role in social protection and development, adds yet another complexity in the labour markets. As pointed out earlier, labour markets are very much social constructs and in many ways they reflect the prevailing (sometimes historical) social characteristics. This means that in the Somaliland

context clan, regardless of its many positive aspects, can create inefficiency in the labour markets where some jobs get allocated on the basis of clan lineage and not on the merit brought from ability and skills of the job seeker. A large number of university graduates whom I spoke with emphasised this trend and some went as far as saying clan is the only route to get employed in Somaliland.

My research in Somaliland highlighted that clan dynamics in the labour markets are neither simple nor straightforward. Although at the macro level clan units look cohesive especially in dealing with clan-wide concerns, significant class structures exist within the clans and sub-clans. These social classes can be determined, although not comprehensively, by wealth. Other indicators of class include an association to a prominent individual, being from the diaspora or having a close association to one, and having education. Interestingly, these classes can at times form links with similar classes beyond the boundaries of a particular clan. At the micro level these classes are hard at work and I would argue that although clan is indeed important in the functioning of the labour markets, it is not sufficient for the mechanism – employer from clan x giving a job to seeker of clan x, to work. Other class and personal relationships have to be in place, and these relations are crucial in how graduates fare in the labour markets.

Furthermore, the types of jobs that graduates seek can also determine which relations they need to call upon. For example, if a graduate is looking for a job in the public sector, it is common practice for them or their parents to approach their aaqil or sultan (clan leaders) and ask the leaders to speak on their behalf to a specific minister (usually from the same clan) and recommend them for employment in that ministry. Of course it is also possible to use other routes to approach employers. For example, one young man in describing his job search explained that although he was not related to the employer, he took his well-known and respected uncle to represent him and his request to the employer. Although there were no clan affiliations, the status of the uncle and his prior relationship with the employer was an avenue this young person could utilise to get a job. His strategy was indeed successful.

In many ways, the clan and social connections work as a system of recommendation and reference.



In an environment where a serious information asymmetry exists on the skills of workers and the location of job vacancies, these social connections are crucial in linking job seekers and employers. Of course this is heavily biased towards youth with effective (and profitable) social connections that they can utilise when needs arise.

### What next?

Looking at education and the labour market experiences, it is true that educated youth in Somaliland face many challenges. I would argue, however, that they equally have many opportunities. As Somaliland continues to develop and as the government takes steps to streamline the higher education sector and correct inefficiencies in the labour markets, youth employment outcomes will continue to improve. In addition, Somaliland youth in general are surrounded by very supportive social/clan structures that if pushed in certain directions could prove very beneficial for youth development. With the right incentives, clan efforts could be channelled towards youth-oriented activities such as creating youth trust funds for entrepreneurial ventures.

To really understand youth employment in Somaliland, we have to move away from categorizing youth as being employed and unemployed. Social/cultural understanding on what it means to be employed and unemployed is crucial for the creation of effective and targeted interventions. Equally important is an in-depth understanding of youth categories and how they interact with the labour markets. Understanding social processes within the labour markets is also vital given that labour markets are made up of people who reflect how society functions.

In addition, the government, with the help of development partners, youth organisations and higher education institutions, needs to launch awareness programmes that will work towards educating Somalilanders about their economy and the functions of and opportunities within labour markets. This could help young people form realistic expectations about

the types of jobs they can secure. Youth and society's perceptions about the economy and the labour markets in general are possibly one of the most powerful and effective tools to improve job allocation in the economy.

The fact that two-thirds of Somaliland's population are young people means the country's major strength lies in this demographic trend especially given the fact that Somaliland is in its early years of reconstruction and development. What is crucial for the Somaliland government is to ensure that the right policies and programmes are put in place to capture the energy and enthusiasm of youth especially in their efforts to access higher levels of education and employment. Somaliland youth exude confidence and need to be given an opportunity to rise to the challenge of helping Somaliland develop in spite of its lack of international recognition. Involving youth will not only give them a sense of pride and nationalism, but will also help reduce the large number of them leaving Somaliland every day, through dangerous means, hoping to find meaningful life elsewhere.

Finally, the Somaliland government, the Somalia government, the African Union and the international community need to make a decision on the status of Somaliland very soon. Transforming the Somaliland economy into one capable of generating the required levels of jobs, will require significant investment into sectors that are traditionally avoided by development agencies and small scale investors (i.e. large infrastructure projects). Postponing the outcome of recognition or some other type of legal status has crucial implications for the long-term development of the country and subsequently to the livelihood of a large percentage of the population; the youth. Although recognition arguments are usually formed on past grievances, current and future implications of lack of it need to be brought to the table and discussed openly and frankly. In my opinion, the Somaliland youth should hold responsible all the above named parties for helping them realize their right to decent livelihoods.

# The Litigant

Ali Jimale Ahmed

He was frail, emaciated, and gaunt from years of harsh life that had made him trek the length and breadth of the Somali deex plains. It was a Friday morning when he came to visit us in our village, in one of the corners of the capital. We used to call our corner a dark alley, because all the surrounding, more affluent areas were lit, while our village, in the heart of the town, was thirsty for electricity. An older friend of mine used to call it Harlem. I didn't understand his meaning at the time, but nevertheless it sounded exotically appropriate. Harlem. My friend had heard about Harlem from an old Mennonite teacher. A congenial old lady with freckles dotting the landscape of her still pretty face, my friend would reminisce. At times, he would flaunt a song or two he learned in her class. My favorite was "Old MacDonald had a farm," which, to my utter surprise, my mother, through me, also liked. Tell your friend, she would say each time I did a rendition of the song, complete with gestures and onomatopoeic grunts, to sing to his teacher, a song of the Arlaadi. And without waiting for an answer, she, in her crooning voice would sing of the virtues of beans, and of the daunting task of warding off a neighbor's cattle from scouring the field.

To us kids, an ode to beans was the furthest from our minds, as that did not ignite our imagination. I vaguely remember my older friend's Mennonite teacher's comment to my mother's ode to beans: she described it, he said, as a kind of graffiti. That was a strange kind of comment, I thought, since graffiti was what I saw splashed on walls with chevaux de frise on top to discourage trespassers. (Cheval de frise was, I learned in high school, an ingenious idea to embed razor spikes into the top of the wall surrounding

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a house for protection. For some odd reason that I cannot explain, the spikes reminded me of my mother's description of scarecrows.) My mother's stories about beans and scarecrows did not appeal to me or my friends. We liked to hear stories spun about far away places. And Harlem was one such place. Sometimes, I pronounced it as Harram, the Arabic word for "sinful and forbidden." Harram, excuse me Harlem, was in America and it sure sounded like a sinful place, a forbidden corner in the midst of the Big Apple. The Apple, according to my knowledgeable friend, was another name for New York City. Anyway, it intrigued me that our corner had similar characteristics with other corners of the world. After all, we weren't alone living in the midst of darkness, squalor and filth. There was something international about squalor and filth-dwelling, I reasoned.

Each Friday, well let me put it this way, every other Friday, my parents used to invite all, or almost all the elders of the village to a bun session. Coffee beans were cooked in seething hot sesame oil or butter ghee. The eldest man was to eat first. Most of the time it was Grandfather Madaq. Well, to be sure, he wasn't my grandfather, but we were told to call him that out of respect. Grandfather Madaq was in his early 80s and childless. Actually, he never got married, which made most of the community; I mean those who were old enough to gossip and talk about certain stuff, either fear or pity him. It was also reported that he never lost his first baby teeth. Some kind of mystery was associated with that, but it was always beyond our youthful understanding. I personally liked Grandfather Madaq a lot, and that, I think, was why my mother always invited him to our house.

This particular Friday, though, Grandfather Madaq wasn't anywhere to be seen. Perhaps, I thought, someone else had invited him to another house. He was such an affable and good-natured person that you couldn't dislike him. This Friday, my mother told me to spread the praying mat for a new visitor. When he sat down, he told me to come close to him and he started patting my hair. At first it didn't feel strange or funny, but after some time, I thought something wasn't right. His hand would fall on two different parts of my head at the same time, or that was what I thought was happening. I wasn't brave enough to look up as I didn't want him to notice my unease. Then a cup of tea was brought to him, but for some strange reason my mother put the cup on the floor. That was very unlike my mother. At least, she never put the cup on the floor for Grandfather Madaq. Well, I thought, what's in the grass will have to come into the open. Why don't I wait and see. It was rude; at least that was what we were told, to make a visitor uncomfortable with either our words or our actions. The cup lay just where my mother had put it for a long time, which also was unusual. Grandfather Madaq and even the other visitors, and believe me there were many of them, didn't let their tea cool off for so long. Grandfather Madaq would grasp his cup with both hands, taking it directly from my mother's hands, and then hold it up to his temples. I thought our guest this Friday must either have had a cup of tea earlier or wasn't an avid tea drinker. Again this was a strange thing to understand, because most people in my community, especially the elderly, drink many cups of tea each day with lots of sugar. Rag waa shaah, dumarna waa sheeko. (This was a kind of sententious saying concocted by males in the community. I don't want to digress here, but in high school we had a classmate of mixed Somali and African-American parentage. She was funny, and with her American twang, she would say: "Rag waa shah, dumarna waa shaqo." Her bold inscription appropriated the saying, and gave it a new twist: In her interpretation of the saying, men were still avid tea drinkers, but women in the new rendition were not weavers of idle stories, but a hard-working and diligent lot. I liked her a lot. Well, that's me now talking, but I should not opine in my story. My views should remain my private views, and should not intrude into the story. Miss Block, my fifth grade teacher from Florida, once asked me to account for my use of

parenthetic sentences. Apparently, I could be carried away by their lure. That is what I have just done. Miss Block's admonition, "Do your parenthetic sentences qualify or amplify your intentions?" has become a second habit. I'd better return to my story lest I confuse both of us.) I was saying, to satisfy my curiosity, I was tempted a couple of times to remind our visitor of the cup of tea, but I thought perhaps my mother or even my father, that is, if he comes home from the house of his junior wife this early, would remind the visitor of his cup of tea. And then I thought perhaps Mother forgot to put the necessary spices in the tea. You know how old people are sometimes meticulous about what they drink. Perhaps, unable to smell cardamom, ginger, and cloves, he let his tea sit on the floor untasted lest he "disturb" his host, who should have the sense to understand that this was the reason he didn't drink it in the first place.

About half an hour later, my mother brought the bun in a wooden kurbin dish with a wooden spoon. No sooner had she put it on the floor than our visitor held the wooden spoon in his right hand. So I was right. Awliya Allah! He couldn't hold on to the spoon. Each time he tried to dip it in the bowl, he made a mess. I was really terrified to watch him struggle with the spoon. I didn't keep my gaze on him, as that would invite my mother's disapproval. And you wouldn't want my mother to be mad at you! She might even throw whatever is in her hands at you. Allah, how good she was at feinting with the left hand. Fear, however, didn't make me stop looking at him with some sidelong glances. I couldn't understand why my mother didn't help him eat his food, or even let me help him eat. I thought my mother didn't like our visitor this Friday. But then why invite him in the first place?

When he ate what he could, my mother gave him some money and he left showering our house with blessings. He was sweating profusely, which was reasonable, I thought, after what he had gone through to feed himself.

Later in the day, in the shade of our verandah, my mother, sensing my curiosity, explained to me certain things about the visitor. As a young man, Aw Madag (that was his name) had been a very energetic person. His father Muddawi had a lot of children, both male and female. My mother's mother was one of his many daughters. Aw Madag, like the rest of his brothers,

looked after the camels and cattle of his father. But this visitor was different from the rest of his peers. As a young man he would always sneak off to the nearest town and visit the colonial courts in session. He, of course, didn't understand the language in use, but he was greatly fascinated with the procedures he witnessed. Soon after that, he developed a proclivity for suing other people. The practice got out of hand after the death of his father. Rumor has it that one evening his mother tried to stop him from taking to court one of her relatives. Aw Madag was so involved with the case that he forgot who he was talking to. With one blow, he hurled his own mother on to the ground and proceeded with his case, which he won. It was said that on the third morning after that incident, he woke up with both his hands shaking. It was a form of paresis that never left him since.

Desperate for money to live on, he became an even more compulsive suer. It was reported that one day his oldest son fell from a tree and broke his arm. The poor boy came crying to his father in excruciating pain. When he told him of his injury, Aw Madag asked the kid:

Who threw you from the tree?

No one.

Who was with you on the top of the tree?

No one.

Who was playing on the ground below?

No one.

Was there any one in the vicinity?

No.

Could you see anyone looking in your direction, even from afar?

No.

Impatient with his son's answer, Aw Madag shouted at him, "Couldn't you even name one single person in this large community as the culprit? May you die for death is what you deserve."

After that incident, no one in the community wanted to have anything to do with him or his household. The neighborhood kids were warned by their parents to keep away from Aw Madag's children. I guess his house became another Harlem, where kids from other neighborhoods weren't allowed by their parents to venture or stray into.

Many people thought that Aw Madag would refrain from practicing this alien tradition once its propagators left this country for good. But it wasn't to be. In fact, on the night of independence, it was rumored that he was scheming to renew a case which the outgoing Italian Magistrate had ruled against him. As one of his neighbors once commented, "Ayax teg, eelna reeb," meaning, "Don't be fooled by the migration of the locust. They leave their larvae behind."

Five years ago, in our corner, while on vacation from my boarding school, I heard older men at a tea shop talking about what had become of Aw Madag. He died peacefully in his bed in the same dark corner of the city. But what intrigued them were his last words, addressed to his children. "you remember the brown calf that was run over by Soofakali's truck... (hiccup)...I was to appear in court the day after tomorrow... (hiccup)...all legal documents are in my white jacket... (hiccup)...if you are my legitimate sons, don't let him off the hook, fight to the last."



Haddad in Al-Hayat, 2009

(Quelle: <http://andreassozpol.blog.de>).

## Banipal Magazine of Modern Arab Literature

Banipal Magazine of Modern Arab Literature showcases works by contemporary Arab authors in English translation, from wherever they are writing and publishing. An independent magazine, founded in 1998, by Margaret Obank and Iraqi author Samuel Shimon, Banipal's three issues a year present both established and emerging writers through poems, short stories and excerpts of novels, plus book reviews, critical essays and author interviews. Its current 46 issues present an unparalleled archive of Arab literature in translation.

Each issue has a main theme, recent ones being 80 New Poems, Writers from Palestine and Twelve Women Writers. Banipal 47's focus, meanwhile, is Fiction from Kuwait. The issues also include a Guest Writer/ Guest Literature feature with works by non-Arab authors as part of Banipal's mission to promote intercultural dialogue. These have so far included writers from South Korea, Vietnam, Romania, Germany, France and Slovenia.

Last year Banipal celebrated fifteen years of bringing contemporary Arab authors into the canon of world literature. Adonis described it as "Not merely a bridge between two cultures but . . . a laboratory that illuminates the styles of modern Arabic writings", while Anton Shammas declared it "the most open, daring, democratic and attentive magazine of modern Arabic literature". Tetz Rooke has commented: "Banipal has become a beautiful library and a bibliographic gold mine for anyone interested in modern Arab writing" and from Stefan Weidner: "Nowhere in Western languages do I learn more about contemporary, really contemporary Arab literature than in Banipal. The real advantage of your, no! – of our!, magazine, however, is not that it is ABOUT Arab literature, but that it IS Arab literature."

Banipal is available both in print and digital editions, offering an invaluable research resource for all students and readers of Arabic and Comparative Literature. For all information on subscribing, either as an individual or institution, go to: <http://www.banipal.co.uk/subscribe/>. [www.banipal.co.uk](http://www.banipal.co.uk) has a full catalogue of all back issues, plus selected texts and book reviews from each issue and an overall index of contents. An individual digital subscription is just £18 a year worldwide and a print subscription for Europe is £31.50.

## Preis für Freiheit und Menschenrechte 2013

Die Berner Stiftung für Freiheit und Menschenrechte verlieh am 5. November im Berner Rathaus den Preis 2013 an die somalische Übersetzerin und Kulturvermittlerin Leyla Kanyar, Gründerin des Somalischen Integrationsvereins der Ostschweiz und die Schweizer Juristin Tilla Jacomet, Leiterin der Rechtsberatungsstellen des HEKS für Asylsuchende in den Kantonen St. Gallen, Appenzell und Thurgau.

Der Doppelpreis symbolisiert den Zusammenhang zwischen Menschenrechtsfragen im Ausland und in der Schweiz. Die Stiftung ehrt damit das besondere Wirken zweier Frauen, die sich für Asyl suchende Menschen in der Schweiz engagieren und setzt damit ein Zeichen für die vermehrte Beachtung der Menschenrechte im Asylbereich.

Leyla Kanyare, 1971 in Somalia geboren, kam auf der Flucht vor dem Bürgerkrieg in Somalia mit ihrem Mann und ihren zwei Kindern 1991 in die Schweiz. „Ich versuchte dann, möglichst schnell die deutsche Sprache zu erlernen, um mich mit den Leuten austauschen zu können“. Sie arbeitet darauf als Dolmetscherin für ihre Landsleute in Spitälern, in Schulen, beim Sozialamt, Gerichte, Polizei bei der Familienberatung und bei der Rechtsberatungsstelle für Asylsuchende, und musste feststellen, dass viele SomalierInnen in der Schweiz aufgrund ihrer traumatischen Erlebnisse während des Bürgerkrieges es schwer hatten, sich in der Schweiz zurecht zu finden. So gründete sie 2005 den Somalischen Integrationsverein der Ostschweiz (SIVO). „SomalierInnen haben kaum eine Chance, sich hier einzuleben, wenn niemand ihnen erklärt, wie das Leben hier funktioniert“.

[www.freiheit-und-menschenrechte.ch](http://www.freiheit-und-menschenrechte.ch)

## Lettre ouverte de *Médecins sans Frontières* Pourquoi MSF a décidé de quitter la Somalie

Dr. Unni Karunakara

Le 14 août 2013, nous avons annoncé la fermeture de l'ensemble de nos programmes médicaux en Somalie ce qui a provoqué une onde de choc au sein des communautés politique et humanitaire. C'est arrivé à un moment où les grands dirigeants, pour la première fois depuis plusieurs décennies, commençaient à émettre des signes d'apaisement vis-à-vis d'un pays en voie de reconstruction et d'un gouvernement stable. Pour eux, le calendrier de notre décision n'aurait pas pu être pire. Dans les interviews accordées aux médias, il nous a été demandé d'expliquer le décalage entre l'optimisme des gouvernements et la sévérité de notre jugement qui a mené à l'une des décisions les plus pénibles dans l'histoire d'MSF.

Je vais tenter de vous l'expliquer. Tout d'abord, MSF n'est pas une organisation qui se permet de commenter les évolutions politique ou économique. Nous sommes d'abord et surtout concentrés sur la santé des populations et leur possibilité d'accéder aux soins. Dans cette optique, et en nous référant à nos activités largement réparties dans le pays, les nouvelles ne sont tout simplement pas bonnes. Une grande partie de la population somalienne vit quotidiennement avec la malnutrition, la maladie et la souffrance. Elle a peu de chance de trouver des soins de qualité quand elle en a besoin. Nous nous sommes battus pour apporter ces soins dans quasiment tout le pays, au prix de nombreux compromis. Nous avons dû par exemple engager des gardes armés pour protéger nos structures de santé et notre personnel, un procédé auquel nous n'avons recours nulle part ailleurs.

Malgré cette mesure exceptionnelle, nous avons subi plusieurs attaques, dont des enlèvements et l'assassinat de 16 de nos membres. Il y a eu aussi quantité de menaces, de vols et d'intimidations en tout genre.

Il n'y a aucun pays au monde où les risques sont aussi élevés. Les nombreux commentateurs sur Twitter qui ont fait remarquer qu'MSF est réputée pour sa persévérance à travailler même dans les conditions les plus difficiles ont raison. Mais, MSF aussi a ses limites. Et nous avons atteint nos limites en Somalie avec l'enchaînement de meurtres et d'enlèvements au cours de ces cinq dernières années. En décembre 2011, deux confrères ont été brutalement abattus à Mogadiscio. Leur meurtrier, qui avait été poursuivi en justice, reconnu coupable et condamné à 30 ans de prison, a été libéré au bout de trois mois. Deux autres collègues enlevées deux mois plus tôt à Dadaab viennent à peine d'être libérées il y a de cela quelques semaines. Elles ont été retenues en otage pendant 21 mois dans le centre sud de la Somalie. Ces deux évènements nous ont assésés les derniers coups.

Mais la sécurité n'est pas à l'origine de notre départ, ni la présence de criminels. Ce qui a anéanti notre dernière lueur d'espoir de pouvoir continuer à travailler dans ce pays fut le fait que ce sont précisément ceux avec qui nous avons négocié des garanties minimales de sécurité qui ont toléré et admis les attaques contre les travailleurs humanitaires. Dans certains cas, ils ont même activement soutenu les actes criminels commis contre nos employés. Dans beaucoup d'autres cas, ces entités ont entretenu un environnement qui a rendu ces attaques possibles. Personne n'a pris la parole pour dire qu'il est intolérable de menacer, enlever ou tuer des médecins, des infirmiers ou tout autre personne qui essaie simplement d'apporter des soins de santé aux populations qui, sinon, en seraient totalement privées.

Soyons clairs. L'expression « entités en Somalie » ne renvoie pas seulement aux Shebab, bien qu'ils aient pouvoir et autorité dans la plupart des

régions où nous travaillions. Nous ne pointons pas non plus seulement le gouvernement de Mogadiscio, qui a pourtant démontré sa totale indifférence à l'assassinat de nos collègues en 2011, comme le prouve la libération anticipée de leur meurtrier. Au contraire, la conclusion d'MSF est que la tolérance de la violence commise à l'encontre des agents de santé s'est transmise à la société somali et cette tolérance est désormais partagée par la plupart des groupes armés ainsi qu'à différents niveaux du gouvernement civil, depuis les chefs de tribus jusqu'aux commissaires de district du gouvernement fédéral somalien.


La tendance à abuser et à manipuler l'aide humanitaire a encore été démontrée immédiatement après l'annonce de notre retrait de Somalie. En moins de 24 heures, des représentants Shebab locaux ont pris le contrôle de nos hôpitaux de Dinsor et Marere, confisquant stocks et équipement, et renvoyant les patients chez eux sans qu'ils puissent terminer leur traitement. Et en moins de 24 heures, un porte-parole de la présidence somalienne a réagi en disant que « la décision d'MSF est exactement ce que voulaient les Shebab et al-Qaeda, pour qu'ils puissent continuer à faire régner la terreur. Nous demandons à MSF de reconsidérer sa décision et de coopérer avec la population », essayant ainsi à nouveau de nous associer à un agenda politique et militaire, nous, une association humanitaire.

Notre décision de quitter la Somalie a été l'une des plus difficiles à prendre dans l'histoire d'MSF. L'année dernière et au cours du premier semestre 2013, nous avons soigné près de 50 000 patients par mois. Ce qui représente environ 2 000 personnes par jour. A partir de maintenant, beaucoup d'entre eux vont lutter péniblement pour trouver les soins dont ils ont besoin. Pour une organisation de médecins, c'est une immense responsabilité.

Au Kenya, des centaines de milliers de réfugiés somaliens ont désormais encore moins d'espoir de retour. MSF poursuit ses activités médicales pour les réfugiés au Kenya et en Ethiopie, mais dans un contexte sécuritaire, pour nos patients et notre personnel, qui est à peine meilleur que ce qu'il était en Somalie.

Tant que ceux qui ont un tant soit peu de pouvoir ou d'influence en Somalie ne montreront pas qu'ils accordent de la valeur aux soins médicaux destinés aux populations vivant dans les territoires qu'ils contrôlent, tant qu'ils ne respecteront pas ceux qui prennent d'immenses risques personnels pour apporter ces soins, MSF ne retournera pas en Somalie.

(Publié le 20 août 2013 dans le quotidien kenyan The Standard, repris ici avec la permission de MSF.)




### MSF en Somalie en chiffres

#### Activités 2012

- 624'200 consultations ambulantes
- 41'100 hospitalisations
- 30'090 personnes soignées pour malnutrition grave
- 58'620 personnes vaccinées
- 2'750 surgical procedures

#### Investissements de 2003 à 2012:

171.4 Mio Euros



### Somali president urges 'dialogue'.

© Nizar Outhman

#### Leiden am Land

Milich, Stephan/ Pannewick, Friederike/ Tramontini, Leslie (eds.), 2012: *Conflicting Narratives: War, Trauma and Memory in Iraqi Culture*. Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden. 268 p.

Der Irak, so steht zu befürchten, wird uns noch lange beschäftigen: als vielfach zerrissenes Land mit zahlreichen Fronten, mit Personen und Gruppen, die Geschichte und Gegenwart des Landes sehr unterschiedlich wahrnehmen und diese Unterschiede nicht nur friedlich besprechen.

Insofern gibt der Titel des Bandes – conflicting narratives – sehr präzise das Problem wieder, gleichzeitig präzisiert der Untertitel – war, trauma and memory in iraqi culture –, worum es in den achtzehn Beiträgen gehen wird: die Aufarbeitung von diesen ein, zwei, drei Kriegen, die Normal-Iraker in den letzten dreieinhalb Jahrzehnten miterlebt haben, das Entsetzliche, das sie verarbeiten müssen, und die Erinnerung, die sie mit einer Heimat verbindet, die deswegen nicht mehr die ihre ist, weil sie sich völlig verändert hat oder weil sie sie verlassen haben.

Da ist viel Lesenswertes! Zum Beispiel der Beitrag von Fatma Mohsen (Publizistin in London), der zeigt, wie irakische Kultur sich „drinnen“ und „draußen“ unterschiedlich entwickelt hat und wie Krieg und Sanktionen diese Kultur „dürr“ gemacht haben. Oder auch der von drei AutorINNen verantwortete Bericht über die Schwierigkeit (am Beispiel des Irak), sich auf eine Erinnerungskultur – also auf die Bewertung der „Helden“ – zu einigen und dieser in Monumenten und in literarischen Werken Ausdruck zu geben.

Überraschend viele Beiträge sind danach Dichtern und dichterischen Bewegungen und Epochen gewidmet, nur wenige der Prosa (einer über irakische Romanciers in Schweden, einer über irakische Romanciers in Deutschland). Darunter besonders hübsch die Analyse (aus der Feder von Friederike Pannewick) jenes Spiels mit der potenziellen Vieldeutigkeit der arabischen Schrift, mit dem in Sinan Antoons Roman *Irakische Rhapsodie* „the ruling sign systems are rendered inoperative“.

Eine Art Abschlussteil bilden mehrere persönliche Berichte (*schahâdât*), in denen Orte erinnert, vergangene Zeiten zurückgeholt oder Schrecknisse aufgearbeitet werden.

Diesen Sammelband sollten alle zur Kenntnis nehmen, die sich für mehr als fürs Kriegsgetümmel oder die Zählung von Anschlagstoten im Irak interessieren.

Hartmut Fähndrich

Adressänderungen und Rücksendungen an: SGMOIK, Postfach 8301, 3001 Bern

## Über die SGMOIK / Sur la SSMOCI

Die SGMOIK will dazu beitragen, das Verständnis für die Kulturen und Gesellschaften Westasiens und Nordafrikas in unserem Lande zu fördern. Sie tut dies, indem sie den Dialog mit den mittelöstlichen und islamischen Nachbarkulturen pflegt und wissenschaftliches, publizistisches sowie künstlerisches Schaffen unterstützt.

Die SGMOIK versteht sich als Forum für alle, die mit der Region Westasien/Nordafrika in irgendeiner Weise beruflich zu tun haben. Die Vermittlung zwischen der universitären wissenschaftlichen Forschung, den Medien, der Politik und der interessierten Öffentlichkeit ist ihr ein wichtiges Anliegen.

La SSMOCI a notamment pour but de favoriser, en Suisse, la connaissance des sociétés et civilisations du Moyen-Orient et d'Afrique du Nord. Elle poursuit, dans ce but, un dialogue avec les cultures de divers pays du Proche-Orient et du monde islamique et soutient des activités scientifiques, journalistiques et artistiques.

La SSMOCI se veut un lieu de rencontre et d'échanges pour tous ceux que l'activité professionnelle amène à travailler sur la zone Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord. Elle considère qu'elle a pour principale tâche de servir d'intermédiaire entre la recherche scientifique universitaire, les médias, la politique et un plus large public intéressé.

### SGMOIK SSMOCI Beitrittserklärung – Demande d'adhésion

Ich möchte/wir möchten der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft Mittlerer Osten und Islamische Kulturen (SGMOIK) beitreten als:  
Je souhaite/nous souhaitons adhérer à la Société Suisse Moyen Orient et Civilisation Islamique (SSMOCI) en qualité de:

- Einzelmitglied/membre individuel (Fr. 60.–) Name/Nom \_\_\_\_\_
- Ehepaar/Couple (Fr. 80.–) Vorname/Prénom \_\_\_\_\_
- Student(in)/Etudiant(e) (Fr. 30.–) Adresse \_\_\_\_\_
- Universität: \_\_\_\_\_
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- Sprache/Langue:  Deutsch  Français Tel. Geschäft/Bureau \_\_\_\_\_

Einladung(en) zu regionalen Treffen in: / Invitation(s) pour les rencontres régionales à:

- Basel  Bern  Genève/Lausanne  Zürich

Beruf oder Tätigkeit, die mit dem Vereinszweck im Zusammenhang steht. / Quelle est votre activité relative au but de la société?

Einsenden an/A renvoyer à: SGMOIK, Postfach 8301, 3001 Bern Datum/Date \_\_\_\_\_